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This thesis provides a critical view of the way the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) 
has applied rights and freedoms under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the 
“Charter”) to corporations.  I argue that a close reading of SCC cases involving 
corporations seeking protections under the Charter reveals that the SCC is bound by a 
conception of corporate personhood that binds judicial decision-making.  This result 
seems to stem from the SCC’s unconscious use of language that is consistent with 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  This results in a slavish commitment to 
revealing the truth of corporations and applying the Charter accordingly.  In place of this, 
I argue that Wittgenstein’s subsequent approach to language in the Philosophical 
Investigations helps reveal that corporations are not objects with internal states of 
affairs; rather, “corporation persons” is just another language game.  Seeing language 
this way helps do away with a commitment to truth about corporations and frees the 
SCC to see them as economic tools that are subject to our control. 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
Corporations have been equated to psychopaths and Frankenstein (Bakan 56, 
Liggett Co 567).  They pursue wealth with a singular focus.  This pursuit of wealth is not 
only the function of a corporation but it is mandated by law.  Corporations are therefore 
committed to and deeply self-interested, a pursuit that is supported and required by 
Canadian statutory and common law.  Despite these monstrous characterizations of 
corporations, Canadian law recognizes corporations as persons despite having “neither 
bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned” (Anderson et. al. 1).  Initially, 
corporations were likened to a person as a way to conceptualize the difference among 
the person who creates a corporation, the person or people who manage corporations, 
and those who invest in corporations from the corporation itself.  Corporate personhood, 
therefore, was a suitable metaphor to delineate the corporation from others who deal in 
or with corporations.  Mostly, the concept protects investors and shareholders from the 
debts and liabilities of the corporation. 
Despite a corporation’s singular dedication to making a profit and despite the 
monstrous comparisons made about corporations, the Supreme Court of Canada 
(“SCC”) has extended the notion of personhood for corporations to allow it protection 
under the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11 
(for the purposes of this thesis, I shall refer to this as the “Charter”).  Granting Charter 
rights and freedoms to an entity whose sole purpose is to pursue a profit results in the 
protection of the economic interests of this legal fiction.  Granting corporations access to 
the Charter provides a legal avenue, when appropriate, for corporations to challenge 
legislation.  The result of this challenge, if successful, would be a judicial declaration that 
the disputed legislation (or the offending portion thereof) be deemed invalid despite the 
fact that the legislation in question might have a valid social purpose.  Where a 
corporation is fined under the legislation or otherwise limited in its pursuit of profit, that 
corporation – an entity with responsibilities only to itself to generate a profit – can alter a 
small portion of the Canadian legal landscape by challenging laws as inconsistent with 
the Charter.  And while a successful Charter challenge by a corporation also benefits 
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natural persons, it has the absurd result of protecting the economic interests of 
corporations. 
This absurd result is, in part, brought about by the SCC.  In its numerous Charter 
judgements involving corporate challenges, the court has hypostatized corporations; 
they treat this abstract and mythical concept as something concretely real.  They have, 
on occasion, treated corporations as something that exist independent of the positive 
law, the very law that gave rise to their existence, and granted them the same 
ontological status as natural persons.  In doing so, the SCC has employed a 
representationalist account of language.  It is precisely through this representationalist 
account of language that the SCC has hypostatized corporations. 
A representationalist account of language requires that language functions as a 
medium whereby the speaker utilizes language accurately or inaccurately to describe 
the world.  Language, then, must reach out to reality and accurately describe it for 
something to be true.  This account of language is consistent with Wittgenstein’s early 
philosophy of language depicted in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  The judges of 
the SCC tend to use a representationalist approach to language, albeit inadvertently, 
when discussing what corporations are for the purposes of Charter cases.  They are 
inclined to see corporations as possessing interests, interests in freely expressing 
themselves, for example.  Where a corporation’s “interests” align with the purpose of a 
Charter right or freedom, the SCC has historically granted corporations the right or 
freedom in question.  This method of determining the scope of a Charter right or freedom 
is called the purposive approach. 
The SCC has also employed corporate theory as a way to distinguish corporate 
personhood from natural persons.  This mode of theorizing has often resulted in the 
differences between corporate and natural persons; however, the premise is that there is 
an entity called a corporation that exists, which demands that we describe it correctly.  .  
In this thesis, I will argue that both the purposive approach and corporate theorizing 
hypostatizes corporations and, in doing so, the SCC uses language in a manner 
consistent with the representationalist model of language.  Moreover, I shall argue that 
Canadian courts ought to move away from this approach to language in favour of seeing 
language as a series of games, a view espoused by Wittgenstein in his late work. 
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A litigant may also seek standing in Charter declaratory actions to challenge 
legislation as invalid under the Charter.  The overall effect is the same: a corporation will 
benefit from the Charter challenge whether it is granted the right or freedom or simply 
given standing to make a Charter argument.  Moreover, I will suggest that arguments 
that rely upon standing resulting in benefits to corporations also rely, indirectly, on a 
representationalist model of language.  To avoid the absurdity of this result, I argue that 
the SCC (and Canadian courts in general) ought to adopt an approach to language 
closer to the philosophy of language as it is expressed in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations. 
I will contrast the SCC’s representationalist-type language with how the courts 
ought to be using language by explaining and applying Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations in which language is understood as a form of social practice within 
specific rules.  Through the lens of language as a social practice comprised of different 
language games, the SCC can provide a separate account of corporate Charter rights 
through the recognition that the concept of corporate personhood occupies a different 
language game than that of natural personhood.  With this recognition, the SCC can 
unshackle itself from the purposive analysis, corporate theorizing, and/or corporate 
standing that treat corporations as facts that language must accurately describe.  In 
place of these approaches to describing corporations, the courts can shift their approach 
to language in favour of a discourse that recognizes that language is comprised of 
different language games.  This proposed shift in language will relieve Canadian courts 
of their perceived need for fidelity to the concept of ‘corporation’ in favour of a far less 
rigid conception whereby corporations are granted rights or freedoms only when it 
serves to promote and protect actual people. 
The hypostatization of corporations through judicial discourse effectively limits 
what policy makers can do when legislating because their decisions (through legislation) 
are subject to the review of Canadian courts.  For example, when any level of 
government passes a law, it must be mindful not to tread on the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons.  The Charter, then, is a mechanism that limits governmental law-making 
authority vis-à-vis persons, including corporations.  I will argue that changing the way in 
which judges talk, a way that is consistent with Wittgenstein’s view set out in the 
Philosophical Investigations, will help the SCC not only shed its representationalist 
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commitment to language but adopt an approach to corporations that sees them as 
merely economic tools that are subject to judicial scrutiny and control. 
To arrive at this conclusion, I shall provide an overview of the historical 
developments of corporations through case law.  Looking at the genesis of and changes 
to the conception of corporations through British and Canadian cases in chapter two will 
reveal how the common law has attempted to forge a unified and consistent conception 
of corporations but has ultimately failed to do so.  So even on a representationalist view 
of language, it appears impossible to know what the facts of a corporation are.  In 
chapter three, I will then survey cases that have been appealed to the SCC, which 
involve corporations that have invoked the Charter.  In reviewing these cases, I intend to 
show how the SCC utilizes language resulting in the hypostatization of corporations, 
whether through the actual granting of a Charter right or freedom or by granting the 
corporation standing to make a Charter argument. 
Once I have provided a history of Charter cases involving corporations, I will 
review several Canadian cases in chapter four that consider the scope of internal 
corporate governance.  By surveying these cases, I will unveil what, at a fundamental 
level, corporations are.  This will reveal how the SCC’s purposive analysis is misguided 
because corporations have a single purpose: to derive a profit.  To therefore equate 
corporate personhood with natural personhood exposes the need for a new language 
game for corporations. 
As such, in chapter five, I shall argue how the SCC has used language in a 
representationalist fashion by summarizing and applying Wittgenstein’s early philosophy 
of language and then demonstrating how the SCC (and Canadian courts generally) can 
avoid the pitfalls of a representationalist commitment to language that can be corrected 
by adopting a way of thinking about language consistent with later Wittgenstein’s views 
on language.  Understanding language as a series of games could be a gateway to a 
more critical understanding of the consequences of granting corporations rights and 
freedoms under the Charter; moreover, it could open up a productive dialogue that both 
recognizes how corporations occupy a different language game and that granting 
corporations rights and freedoms under the Charter, under certain conditions, can 
effectively serve to expand and protect the rights and freedoms of natural persons. 
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Chapter 2.  
 
The Genesis of Corporate Personhood 
In this chapter, I want to trace the case law starting in the United Kingdom and in 
Canada (with one case from New Zealand) that shows how the corporation was first 
recognized as a separate legal person and how that concept has developed over time.  
Through the history of this case law, I intend to show two things: first, that the courts in 
Canada have not developed a consistent idea of corporate personhood; and second, 
that the courts are indeed willing to set aside the separateness of corporate personhood 
in the promotion of justice. 
By surveying the case law where the issue of corporate personhood arises, I will 
trace the development of corporate personhood and explain how Canadian courts have 
tried to create a unified concept of corporate personhood.  The courts have, however, 
struggled to find a singular concept of corporate personhood.  Despite this, I will later 
argue that the SCC has been willing to recognize a robust sense of separate 
personhood for corporations when it comes to corporate challenges to legislation where 
the Charter is invoked.  Second, I will survey a number of cases where courts have been 
willing to set aside the separate identity of the corporation.  The courts are willing to set 
aside corporate personhood when it would otherwise oppose justice.  In chapter 5, I will 
argue from analogy that courts, as a general rule, are similarly justified in setting aside 
corporate personhood and, as a result, are not entitled to the benefits of the Charter.  
And I argue that this is acceptable despite Canadian statutes that recognize the 
separate personhood of corporations.  To begin this discussion, I will discuss some 
background to the advent of the corporation and the case law that has dealt with this 
concept. 
Corporations have existed since (approximately) 1670 and can be traced back to 
statutory law (McGuinness 411).  In England, they derived their existence by way of 
either a royal prerogative or by a special act of parliament (VanDuzer 90-91).  Because 
each of these methods of incorporation was time consuming and cumbersome and, 
therefore, limiting efficient access to the marketplace, the English Parliament passed the 
Joint Stock Companies Act, 7 & 8 Vict., cc. 110 & 111, in 1844 (VanDuzer 91).  This 
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enabled the creation of corporations through a much simpler process that required the 
registration of certain documentation.  Since the passing of this statute, corporations still 
come into existence through registration in England (VanDuzer 91).  Subsequently, the 
English Parliament passed the Companies Act, (U.K.), 1892, c. 89 (the “Companies 
Act”).  This statute, which also requires the registration of corporations, is the model for 
incorporation in many Canadian jurisdictions today (VanDuzer 92). 
Once created, a corporation “ordinarily consists of a group of individuals who 
have pooled their various resources for common benefit” which “entails the severing of 
all legal connections between individual shareholders and the assets, liabilities, and 
direct control over the business” (Welling 76 and 82).  The corporation is managed by 
directors and officers and will have a shareholder or shareholders.  The benefit of being 
a shareholder is that they can enjoy a return on their investment while avoiding the 
burden of unlimited personal liability.  Prior to the advent of corporations, those who 
entered business as a sole proprietor or partner in a partnership were took on liability 
that exposed all of their personal and business assets in the event of a lawsuit against 
them.  However, it wasn’t until the English case of Salomon v. A. Salomon and Co. 
[1897] A.C. 22, 66 L.J. Ch. 35, 75 L.T. 426, 45 W.R. 193, 41 Sol. Jo. 63 (Eng. H.L.) 
(“Salomon”) that there was judicial recognition that corporations, once properly 
registered, are indeed a separate legal person from the company’s shareholders and 
directors. 
In Salomon, the House of Lords had to determine whether certain creditors of A. 
Salomon and Co. could recover losses from the natural person, Aron Salomon - who 
created and controlled the company – or whether those creditors were limited to 
recovery of their losses from the company itself.  Mr. Salomon was a shoemaker and ran 
his shoe-making business as a sole proprietor.  Eventually, Mr. Salomon wanted to take 
advantage of the limited personal liability offered by the United Kingdom’s Companies 
Act so in 1892 and he incorporated a company (Welling 78).  Section 6 of the 
Companies Act required that there be at least seven shareholders.  To satisfy this 
requirement, Mr. Salomon, his wife and five adult children each subscribed as 
shareholders.  Mr. Salomon held 20,001 shares with each of his family members holding 
one share (Davies 34).  Mr. Salomon and his two sons were directors (Salomon 48; 
Welling 78). 
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On June 1, 1892, the newly created company purchased from Mr. Salomon the 
assets of the business, which were held by him as a sole proprietor (Salomon 48).  A. 
Salomon and Co. purchased Mr. Salomon’s assets through the issuance of shares and, 
more importantly, a secured debenture to Mr. Salomon in the amount of £10,000 
(VanDuzen 126).  This debenture was secured against the assets of the company so 
that if the company went bankrupt, Mr. Salomon, as a secured creditor, would rank first 
among any other creditors for the distribution of any remaining assets. 
In less than a year, A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. became bankrupt.  Upon bankruptcy, 
there were only enough assets to pay back the £10,000 debenture to Mr. Salomon; with 
insufficient assets to pay back other unsecured creditors (Welling 78; VanDuzen 126; 
Davies 34).  The liquidator, who was appointed under the Companies Act to wind up the 
company and distribute any remaining assets to creditors, had to ensure payment of any 
assets of A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. to creditors in priority sequences.  As a secured 
creditor, Mr. Salomon was entitled to payment prior to any unsecured creditors 
(McGuiness 67; VanDuzen 126) and was “thus paid first rendering the unsecured 
creditors’’ debt unsatisfied (Salomon 48).   
In an attempt to recover their losses, the unsecured creditors, through the 
liquidator, took legal action against Mr. Salomon, the natural person.  The plaintiff 
creditors argued that A. Salomon and Co. Ltd. was a sham and that the creditors were 
ultimately doing business with Mr. Salomon the natural person, not the company.  
Because Mr. Salomon was personally carrying on the business and he effectively 
granted himself a secured debenture, the company was little more than an agent on 
behalf of Mr. Salomon.  As such, Mr. Salomon’s claim for the debenture was simply a 
claim against himself (VanDuzen 126). 
As a corollary to the argument above, the creditors argued that the company was 
not duly created (McGuiness 67).  Each of Mr. Salomon’s wife and children were issued 
one share each.  With Mr. Salomon owning 20,001 shares, there was an imbalance of 
power.  Therefore, each of the family members were not acting with a mind of their own 
as shareholders but were under the direction of Mr. Salomon.  Rather, the creditors 
argued, there should be a balance of power in the creation of the company and this lack 
of balance rendered the creation of the corporation a sham (Davies 3).  The 
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incorporation of the company was, according to the liquidator, inconsistent with the true 
intent of the Companies Act (McGuiness 67). 
In addressing the question of whether the company was a sham, the House of 
Lords considered the intent of the Companies Act.  On behalf of the House of Lords, 
Lord Halsbury claimed that he could “only find that the true intent and meaning of the Act 
[is to] give a company a legal existence with … rights and liabilities of its own, whatever 
may have been the ideas or schemes of those who brought it into existence” (Salomon 
39).  He went on to say that if the “Legislature intended to prohibit something, it ought to 
specify what that something is” and the Companies Act does not require “the 
incorporation of seven independent, bona fide members, and a will of their own and 
were not the mere puppets of an individual who, adopting the machinery of the Act, 
carried an old business in the same way as before when he was the sole trader” 
(Salomon 38).  
Lord Justice Kay agreed with Lord Halsbury stating that the Companies Act was 
“intended to allow seven or more persons bona fide associated for the purpose of trade 
to limit their liability under certain circumstances and to become a corporation” (Salomon 
39-40) and went on to say that the House of Lords has “nothing to do with the question 
whether such a result be right or wrong, politic or impolitic, if this company has been duly 
constituted by law.  Whatever may be the motives of those who constitute it, I must 
decline to insert into the Act of Parliament limitations which are not to be found there” 
(Salomon 40). 
The law that emerges from the Salomon case is that companies are “a distinct 
legal persona” (Salomon 45).  The practical result is that companies shield certain 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, officers and directors, from any of the rights, 
liabilities and obligations that properly belong to the company.  Therefore, the liquidator 
was unsuccessful in suing Mr. Salomon, the natural person, for the debts of his 
company.  The company, as a separate legal person from Aron Salomon, was under a 
contractual obligation to pay back any monies owing to its creditors.  And since Mr. 
Salomon was one of those creditors – and a secured one at that – his debt was paid 
first.  With no money remaining in the company, the liquidator was unable to turn to the 
principle of the company, Mr. Salomon. 
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That corporations are separate legal persons has a number of legal 
consequences.  A shareholder may be a creditor, even a secured creditor, of the 
corporation in which he/she holds shares, that shareholder may also be an employee of 
the corporation (VanDuzen 139-140).  This shareholder may also act as a director 
and/or officer of the company.  Despite the multitude of roles that a shareholder may 
play within the company, the corporation owns its own property (VanDuzen 140).  While 
a shareholder has an interest in the property belonging to the corporation, that interest 
falls short of ownership (VanDuzen 139).  The company as a separate legal person, 
then, provides limited liability for investors of that corporation, such as shareholders.  
This distinct legal persona, resulting from Salomon, provides clarity for parties, such as 
creditors, wishing to contract with a corporation. 
Salomon is one of the most widely cited cases in common law jurisdictions, and, 
indeed, Canada.  It is commonplace to declare the separateness of corporations from 
those that invest in and manage them.  However, the context in which legal personhood 
has been extended far beyond an economic context.  Lord Justice Kay and Lord 
Halsbury of the English House of Lords both hint towards the limit of corporate 
personhood in Salomon.  To reiterate, Lord Justice Kay said that shareholders limit their 
liability by associating “for the purpose of trade” while Lord Justice Halsbury suggested 
that corporations possess “rights and liabilities appropriate to itself” (Salomon 39-40, 38).  
I will discuss an appropriate interpretation of corporate personhood and its limits in 
Chapter 5; however, these statements by the House of Lords reveal the possibility that 
corporate personhood was a metaphor  that served as means to illustrate how 
shareholders (and others involved in the corporation) enjoy limited liability.  The 
development of corporate personhood starts with Salomon and this has been a key case 
in upholding this concept. 
For example, the case of Lee v. Lee’s Air Farming, Ltd. [1960] 3 All E.R. 420 
(“Lee’s”), originating out of New Zealand and appealed to England’s Privy Council, 
recognized the separateness of an employee of a company and the company itself.  And 
this recognition is consistent with a strict economic interpretation of the Salomon case.  
Mr. Lee formed a company, Lee’s Air Farming, Ltd., in 1954 to carry on his business of 
aerial top-dressing (Lee’s 420).  Mr. Lee was the governing director, controlling 
shareholder and was employed by the company as its chief pilot (Lee’s 420).  Mr. Lee 
had complete control over the company.  During the course of employment, Mr. Lee was 
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killed.  The appellant in this case, Mrs. Lee (and spouse of Mr. Lee) claimed 
compensation under New Zealand’s Workers’ Compensation Act, 1922 (section 3.1) 
(Lee’s 420). 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal denied payment to Mrs. Lee on the grounds 
that Mr. Lee had appointed himself the governing director “for life and there remained 
with the company no power of management whatsoever” and therefore, he could not be 
considered a “worker” if he was both “giving orders and obeying them” (Lee’s 424).  As 
such, the issue before the Privy Council was whether Mr. Lee was a “worker” of the 
company and therefore entitled to a settlement under the Workers’ Compensation Act 
(Lee’s 425). 
Relying, in part, on the Salomon case, the Privy Council found that Mr. Lee was 
indeed a worker.  Lee’s Air Farming, Ltd. kept records of wages paid, Mr. Lee was in fact 
flying the plane on behalf of the company when he died – for which he was paid those 
wages – and, in performing such tasks, the Privy Council said that Mr. Lee was not 
acting as the governing director.  “There appears to be no [great] difficulty in holding that 
a man acting in one capacity can give orders to himself in another capacity” (Lee’s 428).  
For economic purposes, the Privy Council decided that Lee’s Air Farming, Ltd. was a 
separate person from Mr. Lee, the natural person and employee. 
Despite the ruling in Salomon and Lee, which have sided with the idea the 
corporations are separate legal persons, Canadian courts have, at times, eroded the 
separateness between corporations and those that create or hold shares in them.  The 
willingness of the Canadian courts to pierce the corporate veil and disregard the 
separateness of the corporation from a natural person involved in that corporation in 
some commercial disputes renders Canadian common law on companies as a distinct 
legal persona inconsistent.  The lack of clarity around companies as separate legal 
persons, then, renders decisions where Canadian courts have been willing to say that 
companies are separate legal persons in the context of Charter litigation less 
authoritative.  I will visit this idea below in chapter 5; however, I will discuss an SCC case 
that seems to articulate inconsistent interpretations of the Salomon case then review a 
number of other cases where courts have considered arguments  
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While Canadian courts generally do accept that corporations are persons, there 
has been a tendency by courts in Canada to “pierce the corporate veil” where the courts 
“disregard the separate existence of the corporation in relation to some specific claim, 
usually the claim of a creditor of the corporation who would not be paid because the 
corporation has insufficient assets to satisfy the claim” (VanDuzen 143).  Piercing the 
corporate veil occurs when a court disregards the separate personhood of a corporation 
to hold directors and/or officers personally liable (see pages 10 -11 of the Kosmopolous 
decision below).  Piercing the corporate veil, however, merely grants relief to a plaintiff 
but does not result in the dissolution of the corporation.  In most of these cases, the 
court has a principled approach to piercing the corporate veil; however, the SCC’s 
decision in Kosmopoulos v Constitution Insurance Co of Canada, [1987] 1 SCR 2 
(“Kosmopolous”) demonstrates a departure from Salomon and Lee’s above. 
This erosion of the separateness of companies is arguably evident in the SCC’s 
decision in Kosmopoulos.  However, the SCC maintains that the Kosmopolous decision 
strictly upholds Salomon (Kosmopolous 12).  In this case, Mr. Kosmopoulos had a 
leather goods business in which he was the sole shareholder and director of the 
corporation.  He took out an insurance policy on certain business assets when he 
operated as a sole proprietor (Kosmopolous 7).  However, on advice from his legal 
counsel, Mr. Kosmopolous incorporated Leather Goods Limited (Kosmopolous 7).  Upon 
incorporation, Mr. Kosmopoulos took out an insurance policy on the assets of the 
corporation but the policy was made out in his own name.  Subsequently, there was a 
fire that damaged the assets of his business and the insurance company refused to pay.  
The insurer’s refusal to pay arose from the fact that the corporation, not Mr. 
Kosmopolous, owned the assets.  The policy was made out to Mr. Kosmopolous and the 
insurer argued that only the corporation and not Mr. Kosmopolous had an insurable 
interest in the assets (Kosmopolous 7-8; VanDuzen 141). 
In order to obtain an insurance policy, the insured must demonstrate that they 
have an insurable interest.  An insurable interest is the relationship between the insured 
and the thing being insured, a relationship whereby the insured stands to lose if the thing 
being insured is damaged or lost (Boivin 93).  The traditional view is that a sole 
shareholder does not possess a legal interest in the assets owned by a corporation and 
therefore does not have an insurable interest in those assets (Kosmopolous 6). 
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The SCC cited the Salomon case but noted that treating corporations as 
separate legal persons or disregarding this principle and “lifting the corporate veil” to 
reveal a natural person “follows no consistent principle” (Kosmopolous 10).  The SCC 
said in no uncertain terms; however, that it would not add to this inconsistency through 
an attempt to lift the corporate veil (Kosmopolous 10).  Avoiding this inconsistency gave 
rise to another: specifically, the SCC said the sole shareholder, Kosmopolous, had an 
insurable interest when it had previously stated that sole shareholders do not possess 
such an interest. 
For consistency, the SCC should have applied the Salomon case to render a 
decision that would have recognized the separateness of Kosmopolous (who had taken 
out the insurance policy) and his corporation (which had no such insurance policy).  
Rather, the SCC held that Kosmopoulos had “a moral certainty of advantage or benefit 
from those assets but for the fire” and, therefore, he had an insurable interest” 
(Kosmopolous 30).  The sole shareholder, then, was able to access the advantages of 
incorporation – including the lower corporate tax rate and limited shareholder liability – 
while maintaining the benefit of the insurance policy. 
Broadening the scope of ‘insurable interest’ to allow a sole shareholder to have 
an insurable interest over the assets of the company ostensibly left the concept of 
separate personhood for the corporation intact.  However, the SCC reworked the 
allocation of risk that was traditionally set up through the incorporation process.  
Shareholders enjoy limited personal liability when they invest in a company but the 
company itself takes on unlimited personal liability.  The SCC effectively flipped this 
allocation of risk by protecting the corporation for Mr. Kosmopolous’s failure (through his 
lawyers and/or insurance agent) to transfer the insurance policy from his to the 
company’s name.  This reallocation of risk permitted the company to enjoy the protection 
of the corporate veil to shield itself from the conduct of the shareholder.  In trying to 
avoid adding to the confusion of piercing the corporate veil, the SCC effectively conflated 
the separateness of corporate personhood with natural personhood. 
Despite the SCC’s imprecision in the Kosmopolous case around the 
separateness of a shareholder’s and a corporation’s interests, there are instances where 
the courts will pierce the corporate veil on more principled grounds.  The following is a 
sample of cases meant to demonstrate how courts have developed principled reasons to 
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disregard corporate personhood; however, it is not meant to provide a complete 
overview of cases regarding the piercing of the corporate veil.  Canadian court will not 
uphold the separateness of corporate personhood when the courts believe that 
maintaining their separateness would result in a flagrant opposition to justice.1  I will pick 
up again on this principled approach to casting aside corporate identity and argue by 
analogy how the courts can and should take a similarly principled approach when 
refusing to grant rights and freedoms under the Charter to corporations. 
The SCC cited the argument that “those who have chosen the benefits of 
incorporation must bear the corresponding burdens” and that if the veil is to be lifted, it is 
only done “in the interests of third parties who would otherwise suffer as a result of that 
choice” (Kosmopolous 11).  In addition to a historically inconsistent approach, Canadian 
courts have demonstrated a willingness to pierce the corporate veil where recognizing 
the separateness of corporate personhood would result in a flagrant opposition to 
justice. 
While the corporation was held intact in the Ontario case of Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. 
Zhelka et al. [1967] 2 O.R. 565 (“Clarkson”), this case helped shape the principled 
reasons that courts will follow when deciding whether or not to pierce the corporate veil.  
Clarkson Co. Ltd., the plaintiff in this action, sought a declaration before the court that 
certain lands held by the defendants, one of whom was named Ms. Zhelka, were held in 
trust for George Selkirk (Clarkson 565).  Selkirk, who was the brother of Zhelka, had 
incorporated a number of companies for the purposes of his land dealings.  In 1960, 
Selkirk transferred land to Zhelka and then claimed bankruptcy (Puri 104).  Clarkson Co. 
Ltd. was appointed Selkirk’s bankruptcy trustee and argued that first, the land held by 
Zhelka and others was held in trust for either Selkirk personally or one of his companies.  
If the land was held in trust for Selkirk by one of his companies, Clarkson Co. Ltd. 
argued that the corporate veil should be pierced because the company was not an 
“independent trading unit” but rather was a sham or cloak for Selkirk (Clarkson 566). 
Since the court found the transaction between Selkirk’s company, Industrial Sites 
and Locations Ltd. and Zhelka was “for the purpose of defeating, hindering or delaying 
the creditors or prospective creditors…from recovery of their claims, it concluded that the 
                                                
1 See my discussion and Clarkson Col Ltd. v. Zhelka et al. [1967] 2 O.R. 565 on the following two 
pages. 
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property was indeed held in trust for Industrial” (Clarkson 571).  Yet despite the attempt 
to defeat creditors and the fact that Selkirk was “in complete control over” Industrial 
(amongst others) rendering them “one-man companies,” the court could not see “any 
fraud upon Selkirk’s personal creditors…by the operation of his companies” (Clarkson 
577).  In upholding the corporation as a separate legal person from Selkirk, the court 
said that piercing the corporate veil occurs under limited circumstances and that 
Salomon is authoritative when it said that “the legal persona created by incorporation is 
an entity distinct from its shareholders and directors and that even in the case of a one-
man company, the company is not an alias for the owner” (Clarkson 577).  The only time 
the court will pierce the corporate veil, according to the court in Clarkson, is where it 
“would be flagrantly opposed to justice” to continue to recognize its separate existence 
(Clarkson 578). 
This flagrant opposition to justice may arise when first, the company is set up as 
an “alias or a sham” (Clarkson 578).  This can arise when company is merely an agent 
of a controlling person.  Second, the courts will pierce the corporate veil when the 
company is “formed for the express purpose of doing a wrongful or unlawful act, or, if 
when formed, those in control expressly direct a wrongful thing to be done” (Clarkson 
578).  In cases where evidence supports one or both of these flagrant oppositions to 
justice, the court will hold liable both the corporation and the person responsible for the 
wrong. 
A corporation being used to perform an unlawful act formed the foundation for 
the British Columbia Supreme Court to disregard the separate identify of a corporation in 
the Big Bend Hotel v Security Mutual Casualty Co, 1980 CanLII 505 (BC SC) (“Big 
Bend”) case.  The British Columbia Supreme Court had to determine whether to enforce 
an insurance policy in favour of Big Bend Hotel.  Vincent Kumar incorporated Big Bend 
Hotel and applied to Security Mutual for an insurance policy in the name of the hotel.  
However, Mr. Kumar failed to disclose that he had previously suffered fire-loss (Big Bend 
para 6).  The hotel burned down and the insurer discovered Kumar’s previous fire-loss 
claim.  As a result, the insurer refused to pay out (Big Bend para 8).  The British 
Columbia Supreme Court found in favour of the insurer stating that the corporation was 
set up for the sole purpose of disguising this fraud and treated the claim as if Kumar had 
made it personally (Big Bend para 28; VanDuzen 145).  The British Columbia Supreme 
Court said that there are exceptions to the separateness of personhood for corporations 
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despite “Canadian and English courts rigidly adher[ing] to the concept set out in 
Salomon…that a corporation is an independent legal entity not to be identified with its 
shareholders (Big Bend para 24).  And one of these exceptions is when there is 
“improper conduct or fraud” (Big Bend para 25). 
In a more recent decision on this issue was the Rogers Cantel Inc v Elbanna 
Sales Inc., 2003 CanLII 43394 (QC CA) (“Rogers”) case where the Quebec Court of 
Appeal similarly pierced the corporate veil.  Guy Annable was the sole shareholder, 
director and principal sales agent of Elbanna Sales Inc.  Elbanna Sales Inc. agreed to 
act as an agent for Rogers to sell and activate cellular phone services (Rogers paras 11-
13).  As part of this agreement, Elbanna, the corporation, signed a non-compete 
agreement stating that it would not enter into agreements with Rogers’ competitors 
(Rogers para 17).  Subsequent to the execution of this agreement, Guy Annable became 
involved in a corporation that directly competed with Rogers and, while he was not a 
shareholder of this new corporation, he was actively involved in soliciting customers on 
its behalf (VanDuzen 145).  Again, citing Salomon, the Quebec Court of Appeal held that 
the “corporate veil between Elbanna and Annable, if there was one in this case, is 
extremely thin” as Annable was the “driving force of Elbanna” (Rogers paras 37-38).  
While Annable did not commit fraud, his solicitation of customers on behalf of a 
competitor constituted a “serious abuse of his role” (Rogers para 41).  This serious 
abuse justified the piercing of the Elbanna corporate veil to reveal Mr. Annable, the 
natural person, thus allowing for the Court to impose personal liability upon him. 
The courts’ willingness to pierce the corporate veil where the corporation is being 
used for an objectionable purpose arose again in the case of Wildman v. Wildman, 2006 
CanLII 33540 (ON CA) (“Wildman”).  The Wildman case arose in the context of a divorce 
where child and spousal support were at issue (Wildman para 1).  Chris Wildman owned 
Precision Landscape Construction Limited.  Precision, the corporate entity, had an 
annual income of approximately $700,000 (Wildman para 2).  At trial, the judge set Mr. 
Wildman’s income at $700,000 and was ordered to pay spousal and child support on the 
basis of that income (Wildman para 10).  Mr. Wildman appealed the lower court’s ruling 
and argued that there was an error in law because the trial judge improperly pierced the 
corporate veil by equating the corporation’s income with his own (VanDuzen 149).  On 
appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal said that “on the facts of this case it would be 
flagrantly opposed to justice to allow [Mr. Wildman] to hide behind the corporate veil” 
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and the “law must be vigilant to ensure that permissible corporate arrangements do not 
work an injustice in the realm of family law” and concluded that piercing the corporate 
veil may be essential to avoid such injustices (Wildman paras 46 and 49)  The Court of 
Appeal ordered Chris Wildman to make support payments on the basis of his corporate, 
not personal, income (Wildman para 50). 
In addition to cases where corporations were being used for unlawful purposes, 
the courts will pierce the corporate veil where it appears that the corporation is simply 
acting as an agent of another (VanDuzen 150).  In this context, agency arises when one 
person, the agent, represents another, the principal.  Agency, therefore, gives rise to a 
relationship where the agent is authorized to bind the principal in contracts with others 
(Fridman 5).  In order for a corporation to function, it must have agents acting on its 
behalf and these agents are (commonly) its directors and officers.  They bind the 
corporation in, for example, contracts with other parties.  However, Canadian courts will, 
in certain instances, pierce the corporate veil where it appears as though the corporation 
is acting as an agent for another, usually the controlling shareholder (VanDuzen 150). 
Canadian law was influenced by an early English case on corporations as agent 
called Smith, Stone and Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corp [1939] 4 All ER 116 (KB) 
(“Smith”).  In Smith, the court listed a number of relevant factors to determine if the 
corporation was acting as agent for a controlling shareholder.  These factors include 
whether: the profits were treated as profits of the shareholder; the person conducting the 
business was appointed by the shareholder; the shareholder was the brain of the trading 
venture; the shareholder made profits by his/her skill and direction; and the shareholder 
was in constant control (VanDuzen 150-151).  These factors must be looked at in the 
context of the purpose for incorporation and how the corporation is used (VanDuzen 
151).  Where a corporation is being used as merely an agent on behalf of a natural 
person, the court will pierce the corporate veil and hold the controlling shareholder liable. 
Canadian courts have upheld the Salomon case and but the history of case law 
demonstrates a number of exceptions to the rule that corporations are persons.  While 
the courts grant corporations the status of a person to gain protections for shareholders 
and do they so on the “unique personality that distinguishes the corporation from its 
members” (McGuinness 419), there is an additional source of inconsistency around 
corporate personhood.  Corporate personhood is not only recognized in case law but is 
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entrenched in numerous provincial and federal statutes.  However, unlike the 
abovementioned cases, these statutes provide that corporations are persons without any 
exceptions.  For example, the federal Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c I-21 (at section 
35(1)) and the British Columbia Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 238 (at section 29) 
have each defined the term “person” to include corporations.  This means that any 
federal or British Columbian statutes that refers to a “person” means both natural and 
corporate persons.  Moreover, the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
C-44 states at section 15(1) that a “corporation has the capacity…the rights, powers and 
privileges of a natural person.”  Similarly the British Columbia Business Corporations 
Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 at section 30 provides that a “company has the capacity and the 
rights, powers and privileges of an individual of full capacity.”  The codification of English 
and Canadian common law provides corporations with a clearly articulated recognition 
that corporations are persons in Canadian law; Canadian case law is far less clear. 
As mentioned, Canadian courts recognize corporate personhood but the courts 
have, at times, been inconsistent in its approach and, at other times, have taken a more 
principled approach to piercing the corporate veil.  In chapter 5, I will argue that it is 
possible to reconcile this inconsistency by, first, changing the way in which the courts 
use language to describe corporations, especially corporate rights under the Charter.  
Eschewing the purposive analysis and corporate rights approach to corporate identity 
frees judges from thinking of corporations as things with internal properties that must be 
properly understood.  In its place, language as a series of games would not rely upon an 
‘accurate’ account of what a corporation is.  Rather, employing language as a series of 
games in the context of corporate Charter rights would free the courts from their attempt 
to articulate the internal properties of a corporation and would allow them to employ 
tests, much like the tests used in cases such as Clarkson, Big Bend, Rogers, Wildman, 
and Smith.  This would allow the courts to consider what, if any, social value there is to 
granting corporations these rights with the aim of curtailing, or at least minimizing, 
corporate wrongdoing. 
Some argue that the application of Charter rights to corporations is merely the 
“logical outgrowth of the separate personality” (Guinness 419).  Seen through the lens of 
philosophy of language, I will argue that there is nothing logical in the outgrowth of the 
Charter being applied to corporations and that this outgrowth can and should, as a 
general rule, be disallowed.  Before considering cases that involve corporations 
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challenging legislation under the Charter in chapter 4, I will discuss, briefly, the role of 
the Charter in Canadian law at the outset of chapter 3.  In chapter 5, I will then explain 
how language has shaped the courts’ conception of corporations and how the courts can 
re-shape this conception in a way that invites a more flexible approach to corporate 
personhood.  To do so, I will propose a test in chapter 6 that permits corporations to 
benefit from rights and freedoms under the Charter but only in very limited cases. 
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Chapter 3.  
 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Rights of 
Corporations 
Before providing an overview of cases decided before the SCC involving 
corporations that have initiated Charter challenges, I will briefly introduce the purpose 
and some of the content of the Charter.  I will also summarize when the Charter applies 
and, more importantly, what remedies are available to a successful litigant.  I will argue 
in chapter 4 that corporations were not created to be included among the bearers of 
rights because they are fundamentally different from natural persons, in part because 
they were created only to derive a profit.  This singular motive renders access to the 
Charter exploitative because of the profound effect that corporations can have on the 
legal landscape in this country.  After this discussion of the Charter, I will survey Charter 
cases brought before the SCC by corporations organized by the relevant right and/or 
freedom. 
3.1. Purpose, Content, Applicability and Remedies 
On April 17, 1982, the Charter officially became entrenched in Canada as a 
constitutional document (McLachlin).  With the advent of the Charter, Canada 
concretized individual rights and freedoms, which was born out of Prime Minster Pierre 
Trudeau’s “desire to anchor Canadian unity in equality and individual rights” (McLachlin).  
The Charter is a “purposive document” which guarantees and protects the listed rights 
and freedoms but within the bounds of reason (Hunter v. Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 
145 at 156).  Therefore, the Charter is meant to prevent any level of government from 
passing legislation that is inconsistent with it.  Over the course of Canadian Charter 
history, some of these rights were extended to corporations. 
The Charter enshrines six broad categories of rights and freedoms: fundamental 
freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, the right to equality, and 
language rights.  The fundamental freedoms include freedom of conscience, religion and 
expression.  Democratic rights include the right to vote while mobility rights permit 
certain classes of persons the right to enter and leave the country as well as gain a 
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livelihood in any Canadian province.  Legal rights guarantee protections against 
unreasonable search and seizure, the right to be tried within a reasonable time and the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person, and the right to be treated equally (Sharpe 
and Roach 48-49; Charter sections 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 15). 
In addition to the individual rights and freedoms, the Charter also recognizes 
Aboriginal rights.  Section 35 of the Charter provides that the “existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”  
Because aboriginal and treaty rights are different in nature than the individual rights and 
freedoms mentioned above, the Charter ensures, in section 25, that individual rights and 
freedoms shall not derogate aboriginal rights (Sharpe and Roach 49; Charter). 
Section 52 of the Charter states that the “Constitution of Canada, is the supreme 
law of Canada and that any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect” (Dickson 15).  As 
such, the Charter allows anyone whose rights or freedoms that have been infringed or 
denied to apply to a court.  The court can, first, determine whether or not the Charter 
applies to a given issue; second, if it does, whether the impugned statute is inconsistent 
with the Charter, third, if the statute (or a provision of it) violates the Charter, whether it 
can be saved by section 1 as a “reasonable limit;” and fourth, if the statute cannot be 
saved by section 1, to apply an appropriate judicial remedy (Charter section 24; Dickson 
15). 
Before the court can delve into the question of whether a statute, or section of it, 
infringes a Charter right or freedom, the court must first ensure that the Charter applies 
to the case.  Section 32(1) of the Charter provides that it applies to “Parliament and 
government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament 
including all matters relating” to the Territories and to the “legislature and government of 
each province” (Charter section 32).  In short, the Charter only applies if any government 
or governmental body makes a decision that affects a person’s right or freedom.  If the 
court determines that the Charter applies, then it must determine whether or not the 
statute has indeed infringed upon a Charter right or freedom. 
Where the court determines such a violation exists, the third step for the court is 
to determine whether the statute or portion of a statute being challenged represents a 
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reasonable limit on the individual right or freedom is question (Sharpe 424).  Built into 
the Charter is the reasonable limits clause at section 1 and states:  “The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society” (Charter section 1).  Section 1 of the Charter allows the 
courts to balance the importance of the individual right or freedom in question with 
broader interests of society (Sharpe 66). 
The SCC first articulated the test for what constitutes a reasonable limit in R. v. 
Oakes, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 103, (“Oakes”),  In Oakes, the accused, David Oakes, was found 
guilty of possessing an illegal narcotic banned under the former Narcotic Control Act, 
R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1.  Section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act provides that where an 
accused is found guilty of possessing an illegal narcotic, that accused is also guilty of 
possession for the purposes of distribution (Oakes 110).  This imposes a reverse onus 
on the accused, which he or she must then provide evidence that they did not intend to 
distribute the narcotic.  Since David Oakes was found guilty of possession, he was then 
presumed guilty of possession with the intent to distribute. 
Oakes argued that this reverse onus violates the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty under section 11(d) of the Charter because the crime of distribution 
was presumed.  Such a provision is contrary to the principle in criminal law that a person 
is presumed innocent until proven guilty (Oakes 111).  The SCC agreed with Oakes and 
declared that section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act was in violation of section 11(d) of the 
Charter (Oakes 134).  The SCC then turned its focus on whether or not the impugned 
section could be saved by section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit on one’s right to 
be presumed innocent. 
The Oakes case gave the SCC an opportunity to create a test that justifies what 
a “reasonable limit” ought to look like.  The SCC set out two central criteria to establish a 
limit that is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society: first, 
the objective of section 1 is to ensure that the legislation is of “sufficient importance to 
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom” (Oakes 138).  Legislation 
that is frivolous will not gain section 1 protection.  Once the court agrees that the 
legislation is of significant importance, the means chosen to limit the Charter right or 
freedom must be “reasonable and demonstrably justified” (Oakes 139). 
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This next step requires proportionality that fairly balances the interests of society 
with those of individuals and groups (Oakes 139).  The proportionality test breaks off into 
an additional three steps.  First, the legislation must be drafted in such a way as to 
achieve the objective in question.  That is, the objectives must not be “arbitrary, unfair or 
based on irrational considerations” (Oakes 139).  The second step requires that where 
there is a rational connection between the legislation and the objective, there must be a 
minimal of impairment to the right or freedom in question (Oakes 139).  And third, “there 
must be a proportionality between the effects of the measure which are responsible for 
limiting the Charter right or freedoms, and the objective which has been identified as of 
“sufficient importance”” (Oakes 139) [emphasis in the original].  This requires that the 
legislation does not have “deleterious effects” on individuals or groups.  As such, the 
more severe the negative effects on individuals or groups, the more important the 
legislation must be “if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society” (Oakes 140). 
In Oakes, the SCC concluded that the reverse onus in section 8 of the Narcotic 
Control Act did not constitute a reasonable limit on the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty.  Since Oakes was arrested for a small quantity of illegal drugs, “it 
would be irrational to infer that a person had an intent to traffic on the basis of his or her 
possession of a very small quantity” (Oakes 142).  This reverse onus is “overinclusive” 
because it might result in jail time for life.  The reverse onus, then, failed the second step 
of proportionality as it could result in jail time for those carrying negligible amounts of 
narcotics (Oakes 142). 
In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (“Irwin Toy”) (which is discussed 
in Chapter 3.4 below), the SCC eased the strictness of the Oakes test resulting in a 
greater deference to legislative action through a contextual approach to limiting rights 
and freedoms under the Charter.  For example, when discussing minimal impairment, 
the SCC said that “in matching means to ends and asking whether rights or freedoms 
are impaired as little as possible, a legislature mediating between the claims of 
competing groups will be forced to strike a balance without the benefit of absolute 
certainty concerning how that balance is best struck” (Irwin Toy 993).  Here, the SCC 
recognizes the tension between competing groups: those who “will assert that the 
government should not intrude” on Charter rights and vulnerable groups who “claim the 
need for protection by the government” (Irwin Toy 993).  However, there are instances 
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where the courts are not asked to strike a balance between competing groups; rather, 
the “government is best characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual whose 
right has been infringed” (Irwin Toy 994).  In these sorts of cases, the “courts can assess 
with some certainty whether the “least dramatic means” for achieving the purpose have 
been chosen” (Irwin Toy 994).  The decision in Irwin Toy, then, introduced a contextual 
approach to the section 1 analysis resulting in more deference to legislative action when 
there are competing rights. 
Based on these factors, the court will determine whether the law in question 
imposes a reasonable limit on the right or freedom.2  Where the law represents a 
reasonable limitation based on the justification that the broader interests of society are 
more valuable than upholding a specific right or freedom, the court will not provide a 
remedy.  However, where there has been both a violation of the Charter and a section 1 
analysis fails to demonstrate that the law imposes a reasonable limit on one’s Charter 
right or freedom, the court will, in accordance with section 24(1) of the Charter provide a 
remedy that is “appropriate and just in the circumstances”  (Charter section 24(1)).  
Remedies available to the courts include declaratory relief whereby the court declares 
that the claimant’s rights have been infringed, injunctive relief, and damages (Sharpe 
432-444). 
More importantly, however, are the remedies that affect legislation, especially as 
it relates to legal liability for companies.  As stated above, section 52 of the Charter 
states that where a law is inconsistent with the Charter, that law is of “no force or effect” 
(Charter section 52).  This allows the courts to impose a number of remedies such as 
striking down the legislation or a declaring that a part of the statute is invalid resulting in 
the severance of it.3  Where the court finds that an entire statute fails to respect the 
Charter, the court can strike the entire statute down (Sharpe 445).  Sensitive to the fact 
that striking down an entire statute can result in a legislative vacuum, the courts have 
devised a number of less intrusive remedies (Roach 1143). Out of respect of the role of 
                                                
2 For a comprehensive discussion on how the courts interpret section 1 of the Charter, see 
Robert J. Sharpe’s and Kent Roach’s “The Charter of rights and Freedoms”, 6th edition, at chapter 
4. 
3 Since a full discussion of remedies is outside of the scope of this thesis, I will limit my discussion 
of remedies to two that corporations can leverage in order to escape liability under a statute.  For 
a comprehensive discussion on judicial remedies, see Robert J. Sharpe’s and Kent Roach’s “The 
Charter of rights and Freedoms”, 6th edition, at chapter 17. 
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the legislature, the courts opt not to drastically disrupt the structure of statutes.  Rather 
than striking down an entire statute, the courts more commonly elect to sever the 
unconstitutional portion of the law (Sharpe 445; Roach 1149).  Severance nicely 
balances the courts need to respect the role of legislatures while ensuring that statutes 
are aligned with the Charter. 
The ability of corporations to claim rights under the Charter and therefore to 
challenge the constitutionality of statutes before a Canadian court has proven to be an 
effective tool in reducing corporate liability.  Corporations have, for example, initiated 
Charter challenges in the following cases: where a corporation was fined under a statute 
that limited a corporation’s ability to advertise its products directly to children; to remain 
open on a Sunday; to prevent a corporation’s directors and/or officers from appearing in 
court and presenting evidence that could have damaged that corporation; or to limit the 
ability of Canadian authorities to conduct investigations.  As a legal “person” under 
Canadian law, corporations have and continue to enjoy the freedom to make such legal 
arguments under the Charter.  Where that corporation is successful in its challenge, it 
may avail itself of one of the judicial remedies (discussed above).  The result is that 
corporations can effect legislative change through the courts by having a section of a 
statute severed resulting in no fine or punishment for that corporation (this will be 
discussed throughout this chapter). 
In the following section, I will provide a summary of cases involving corporate 
legal challenges under the Charter.  I will focus on SCC cases only, some successful, 
where corporations have argued that they are entitled to a broad range of rights and 
freedoms.  In doing so, I will delve into the reasons of the SCC to expose the way in 
those judges discuss corporate rights under the Charter.  This in-depth discussion will 
allow me to argue that courts have hypostatized corporations.  The result has been, I will 
attempt to show, that the SCC has narrowed the discourse on what a corporation is.  
The result is that corporations can use the Charter as a tool to alter Canadian law to 
better suit their pursuit of profit. 
3.2. Introduction to the Charter Rights of Corporations 
Since nearly the advent of the Charter, Canadian courts have assimilated 
corporations into the broader category of rights bearers.  The courts have granted 
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standing to corporation either through the public interest standing or private standing.  
Canada has long standing rules that generally “relate to the question posed, rather than 
the party posing it” (Ross 155).  When public interest standing is sought, three 
considerations, as set out in the Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration) [1992] 1 SCR 236 (“Canadian Council”) must be satisfied: 
“first, is there a serious issue raised as to the invalidity of legislation in question?  
Second, has it been established that the plaintiff [the one seeking standing] is directly 
affected by the legislation or if not does the plaintiff have a genuine interest in its 
validity?  Third, is there another reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before 
the court?” (Canadian Council 253).  If the plaintiff can establish a positive answer to the 
first two questions and a negative answer to the final question, that plaintiff will be 
successful in gaining standing before the courts.  The justification for public interest 
standing is to “avoid immunizing government laws and actions from judicial scrutiny” 
(Philips 23). 
In addition to public interest standing, a plaintiff may seek standing through 
private standing.  This requires the plaintiff who is challenging the constitutional validity 
of a law to “show exceptional prejudice arising from, or special interest in, the challenged 
law” (Ross 175).  This rule was is limited to parties that are the subject of penal 
proceedings (Ross 178-179).  Where an applicant seeks standing, they must seek public 
interest standing.  Where this is not possible, the applicant “needs to show not only 
special prejudice, but that his or her Charter rights are affected” and is applicable both to 
individuals and corporations (Ross 179-180). 
Once granted standing, courts will entertain arguments about whether a 
corporation actually possesses a Charter right or freedom.  This is done through the 
purposive approach.  The purposive approach requires the court to analyze the purpose 
of the right or freedom at issue and then determine whether the corporation has an 
interest that accords with the purpose of that right or freedom (Tollefson 321).  If the 
corporation has an interest that accords with the purpose of the right or freedom then the 
courts will include corporations among those that bear rights and freedoms.  This 
approach may, therefore, result in the assignment of rights and freedoms to corporations 
thus rendering “corporate standing or status [as] largely irrelevant” (Tollefson 321). 
26 
To aid in making a determination of whether a corporation has rights or freedoms 
under the Charter, Tollefson argues that the courts have, at times, relied upon the 
“corporate theory” approach.  This approach, he argued, resulted in the courts delving 
into the nature of corporations to determine if they are sufficiently human to warrant the 
granting of a Charter right or freedom (Tollefson 322).  One such corporate theory is the 
natural entity theory which provides that corporations have “an inner material or social 
reality existing prior to, and independent of, positive law” (i.e. person-made law) 
(Tollefson 318).  The source of corporate being, then, does not arise out of the statutory 
law that enables its existence or as the sum total of shareholder rights that culminate in 
the fiction known as a corporation (Tollefson 315).  Rather, the corporation is a real 
entity and the law merely recognizes its existence (Tollefson 319). 
The SCC has relied upon each of the abovementioned ways to articulate 
corporate rights under the Charter.  I will discuss SCC cases and for each, I will point out 
which of the approaches judges have relied upon.  When determining what interest a 
corporation has through the purposive approach, the courts make corporate theory-like 
arguments, which imply that corporations have an “inner or social reality.”  Additionally, 
however, the SCC drops a purposive approach and focusses only on corporate theory 
(especially in the “life, liberty and security of the person cases in chapter 3.5 below).  I 
will conclude that granting a corporation standing, utilizing the purposive analysis, and/or 
engaging in corporate theory result in the same mistake: the mistake that corporations 
are something that exist independent of positive law to which language, and therefore, 
the law must conform.  I will urge that when the SCC (or any court) argues that 
corporations should or should not have rights through a purposive analysis or corporate 
theory approach, they are assuming that corporations are facts out there in the world 
that require an accurate use of language to correctly portray their internal facts in the 
same fashion as when Canadian courts conduct a purposive analysis for natural 
persons.  Similarly, I will argue that granting standing to corporations commits the same 
mistake. 
In chapters 3.3 to 3.10 of this thesis, I will discuss the varied approaches the 
SCC has employed in addressing corporate rights under the Charter.  While some cases 
result in successful Charter challenges by corporations, some do not.  However, my 
overall conclusion remains that the totality of corporate cases relying on the Charter that 
have been before the SCC have resulted in the hypostatization of corporations.  This 
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hypostatization is dangerous given the law relating to internal corporate governance .  In 
chapter 4, I will expand upon this idea but showing how the law, both statutory and case 
law, is set up to not only allow corporations to act solely with self-interest but how, at 
times, the law demands this. 
3.3. Freedom of Religion Cases 
In the early cases involving the Charter-based freedom of religion, the SCC 
granted corporations standing to challenge legislation on the basis that it violated a 
provision of the Charter.  Of these, one of the earliest Charter cases involving a 
corporation was an appeal to the freedom of religion in the R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 case.  The SCC found that while corporations are not things that are 
capable of having religious views, the court was concerned that the purpose of any 
particular legislation could violate this Charter right.  As such, even a corporation had 
standing to bring such a legal action. 
Big M Drug Mart Ltd., a corporation, was found to be in violation of the now 
repealed Lord’s Day Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13.  The Lord’s Day Act, with certain 
exceptions, prohibited any sale or purchase of goods and prohibited or to employ a 
person to work on the Lord’s Day.  The Lord’s Day was defined as “the period of time 
that begins at midnight on Saturday and ends at midnight on the following night” 
(sections 2 and 4 of the Lord’s Day Act; Big M Drug Mart 301).  Big M Drug Mart Ltd. 
was fined under the Lord’s Day Act for selling goods on a Sunday.   
Big M Drug Ltd. then challenged the fine in court by arguing that the Lord’s Day 
Act violated the corporation’s freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter, 
freedom of conscience and religion.  In addressing this issue, the SCC had to determine 
whether or not a corporation had standing to bring a Charter challenge.  The Attorney 
General for Alberta argued that a corporation, being an artificial person, the creation of 
which is only enabled through statutes, cannot have “a conscience or hold a religious 
belief.  It cannot, therefore, be protected by s. 2(a) of the Charter” (Big M Drug Mart 
312).  In response, the SCC said that a person may seek a remedy under the Charter 
“whether real persons or artificial ones such as corporations” (Big M Drug Mart 313; 
Tollefson 323).  Whether or not the person seeking the remedy can enjoy the right or 
freedom is irrelevant (Tollefson 323-324). 
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The point, according to the SCC, is not that a corporation may or may not enjoy 
or exercise freedom of religion.  Rather, the legislation has the effect of infringing upon 
one’s right to religion.  Similarly, the SCC went on, an atheist would be entitled to bring a 
claim under the Charter despite an atheist having no religious affiliation (Big M Drug 
Mart 314).  And freedom of religion marks a “truly free society” which can accommodate 
a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct.  
A free society is one which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental 
freedoms” and that “[f]reedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent dignity 
and the inviolable rights of the human person.  The essence of the concept of freedom of 
religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to 
manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination” (Big 
M Drug Mart 336) [emphasis mine].  The SCC concluded that the purpose of the Lord’s 
Day Act violated one’s freedom to religion and therefore, the proper remedy was to 
declare the statute invalid, which conferred a benefit not only to natural persons but also 
corporations (Big M Drug Mart 367). 
R. v. Edwards, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (“Edwards”) is another early Charter case 
concerning freedom of religion (the issue of life, liberty and security of the person also 
arose and that portion of this case will be discussed below).  In this case, Edwards 
Books and Art Limited (“Edwards”) (together with three other corporate appellants) 
challenged the constitutionality of an Ontario statute entitled the Retail Business 
Holidays Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 453 on the basis that it violated section 2(a) of the Charter 
(Edwards 724).  Section 2 of the Retail Business Holidays Act prohibited the sale of 
goods by retail on a holiday, which included Sundays.  Edwards (and others) were 
charged and convicted for failing to comply and Edwards in particular remained open 
between the hours of 11 am and 6 pm on Sundays (Edwards 724 and 728). 
The purpose behind the Retail Business Holidays Act was to provide retails 
workers with holidays, holidays that included secular holidays such as Canada and 
Labour Day to allow families and friends the opportunity to coordinate holidays and 
spend their days off with others (Edwards 744-745).  Furthermore, the Law Reform 
Commission prepared a report citing that since “Saturday has come to be regarded as a 
retail shopping or market day” so Sunday was selected as the day for business closures, 
but for secular reasons (Edwards 745-746).  The SCC did not accept the argument that 
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this law was motivated by strictly secular means as it did not accommodate both 
employees and shoppers for whom Saturday is the Sabbath (Edwards 766).  As such, 
the SCC concluded that the Retail Business Holidays Act violated section 2 of the 
Charter.  However, the SCC concluded that despite the constitutional infringement, the 
legislation was saved by section 1 on the basis that the “infringement is not 
disproportionate to the legislative objectives” and a “serious effort has been made to 
accommodate the freedom of religion of Saturday observers” (Edwards 783).  Like the 
Big M Drug Mart case where the SCC granted standing to Big M Drug Mart Ltd, the SCC 
similarly granted Edwards standing.  This same issue came up again in the Hy and Zel’s 
Inc. v. Ontario (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. (“Hy and Zel’s”) case in which corporations 
challenged the constitutionality of the same Ontario statute, the Retail Business Holidays 
Act. 
Hy and Zel’s Inc. (together with another company, Paul Magder Furs Limited) 
challenged the constitutional validity of Ontario’s Retail Business Holidays Act.  To 
reiterate, this statute limited holiday shopping including on Christmas Day and Sundays 
(Hy and Zel’s 684).  Hy and Zel’s Inc. and Paul Magder Furs Limited both argued that 
the Retail Business Holidays Act infringed on section 2(a), freedom of religion and 
conscience, and section 15, the right to be treated equally, of the Charter (Hy and Zel 
688).  In December of 1989, the Ontario government ordered Paul Magder Furs to close 
on Sunday (Christmas Eve), Christmas Day and Boxing Day under the authority of 
section 8 of the Retail Business Holidays Act (Hy and Zel’s 685).  Section 8 provides that 
the Attorney General may order a business closed and impose any other penalty (Hy 
and Zel’s Inc. 685).  Paul Madger Furs challenged this closure.  Similarly, and also in 
December of 1989, the Attorney General brought an application against Hy and Zel’s for 
their failure to comply with the Retail Business Holidays Act (Hy and Zel’s Inc. 687).  
Both corporations brought separate legal actions and both cases ended up 
before the SCC because of the duplication of issues.  Like Big M Drug Mart, there was 
no argument made in support of a corporation possessing freedom of religion; however, 
there was a lengthy discussion involving the appropriateness of granting standing where 
“the party does not claim a breach of its own rights under the Charter but those of 
others” (Hy and Zel’s Inc. 690).  In concluding this case, the SCC stated that the 
appellants (Hy and Zel’s and Paul Magder) did not present sufficient evidence to support 
their claim and failed to show that their own religious rights have been violated 
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“[a]ssuming that corporations can have religious rights” (Hy and Zel’s Inc. 692-693).  As 
such, the SCC denied the appellants standing. 
Unlike the Big M Drug Mart case but consistent with Edwards, the Hy and Zel’s 
Inc. case did not result in a victory for the corporate entities.  The law remains that, when 
appropriate, corporations can attain standing to not only challenge legislation under 
section 2(a) of the Charter but, when successful, to benefit from such a challenge.  While 
the court employed a purposive approach to understanding freedom of religion in the 
latter two cases, the court admitted that corporations have no such interest.  But this is 
irrelevant.  Corporations, like Big M Drug Mart, are still able to benefit from a Charter 
challenge.  Unlike religion which is not a right belonging to corporations, however, the 
SCC has included corporations among those entitled to free expression. 
3.4. Freedom of Expression Cases 
In adjudicating over freedom of expression cases under section 2(b) of the 
Charter, the SCC has included commercial expression as a type of expression worthy of 
protection.  While the courts have categorized types of expression into, for example, 
commercial or political expression, the content of the expression is not at issue.  The 
SCC, in cases such as Canada (A.G.) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, has 
declared that the freedom of expression is “content-neutral and protects the expression 
of both truths and falsehoods” (637).  The focus of this section is on commercial 
expression.  I will neither argue whether commercial expression is worthy of protection 
under the Charter nor the degree of protection commercial expression ought to be 
granted under section 1.  However, I will argue that whether or not expression is 
classified as commercial misses the point when the expression derives from a 
corporation.  Unlike the freedom of religion cases above, the SCC hypostatizes 
corporations by implying that corporations have an interest in the right to freely express 
themselves. 
In Devine v. Quebec (A. G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790 (“Devine”), the SCC had to 
grapple with whether the Charter of the French Language, R.S. Q., c. C-11 infringed on 
a person’s Charter protected right to freedom of expression.  The Charter of the French 
Language made French the official language of Quebec and stated that catalogues, 
brochures and other publications must be in French (section 52), and that public signs, 
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posters and commercial advertising must be in French (section 58) (Devine 799).  The 
appellant, a corporation by the name of Allan Singer Ltd., brought an action challenging 
the constitutional validity of the Charter of the French Language.  The SCC agreed with 
the appellant that a legislative compulsion to communicate in a particular language – 
French, in this case – infringed one’s freedom of expression.  In this case, the SCC 
determined that the scope of section 2(b) includes not only political expression but also 
commercial expression.  The SCC reasoned that it “protects listeners as well as 
speakers” and “plays a significant role in enabling individuals to make informed 
economic choices” which makes up an “important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and 
personal autonomy” (Ford 767) (the SCC cited the Ford case below in support of its 
conclusions). 
By granting a corporate entity the freedom to express itself under the Charter, the 
SCC justified it because it aids in the “self-fulfillment and personal autonomy” of natural 
persons.  Granting freedom of expression to corporations ultimately benefits people.  
However, the SCC overlooked the role of advertising, which is the primary way in which 
a corporation relies on freedom of expression.  Advertising is about “improving brand 
recognition, market demand, and the overall profitability of the enterprise” (Bauman 83).  
While the emphasis on how granting Charter rights and freedoms to corporation affects 
individuals (which is something I will discuss in chapter 6), the claim that self-
actualization is attained, at least in part, through a corporation’s ability to express itself 
through marketing is spurious.  This argument also fails to address any drawbacks to 
granting these rights to corporations. 
The SCC had a further opportunity to address whether commercial expression is 
a type of expression protected by the Charter in the Ford v. Quebec (A.G.) [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 712 (“Ford”) case.  This case was brought by a number of respondents who 
claimed that the Quebec government’s Charter of the French Language violated a 
person’s right to freely express themselves, similar to the Ford case.  In particular, the 
Charter of the French Language required all public signs and posters, and commercial 
advertising to be in French.  Various respondents, who were found to be in violation of 
this law, including a number of corporations, challenged this legislation on the grounds 
that it violated their Charter protected freedom of expression (Ford 721). 
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Once again, the SCC framed the debate, at least in part, around whether 
freedom of expression extends to commercial expression (Ford 754).  In arguing against 
the protection of commercial expression, the Attorney General of Quebec said that to 
“extend freedom of expression beyond political expression, and possibly artistic and 
cultural expression, would trivialize that freedom and lead inevitably to the adoption of 
different justificatory standards under s.1 [of the Charter] according to the kind of 
expression involved” (Ford 763).  Moreover, “[f]reedom of commercial expression, and in 
particular commercial advertising, does not serve any of the values that would justify its 
constitutional protection.  Commercial advertising is manipulative and seeks to condition 
or control economic choice rather than to provide the basis of a truly informed choice” 
(Ford 763).  However, the SCC disagreed.  They stated that the Charter “should be 
given a large and liberal interpretation” and, as such, there “is no sound basis on which 
commercial expression can be excluded from the protection under s. 2(b) of the Charter” 
again because freedom of expression is content neutral (Ford 767).  Furthermore, 
commercial expression has an “intrinsic value as expression” and “protects listeners as 
well as speakers” by allowing individuals to make “informed economic choices, an 
important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy” (Ford 767). 
Unlike the Devine case, the Ford case goes beyond just the effects that 
commercial speech may have on the listener of speech and shifts the focus to the 
“intrinsic value” of commercial expression.  This intrinsic value, according to the SCC, 
arises on the basis of three rationales: democratic self-government; the creation of a 
competitive market-place of ideas; and truth for its own sake because it is an aspect of 
individual autonomy and self-realization (Ford 765).  The hidden assumption is that 
corporations, like natural persons, are capable of partaking in the expression of this 
extrinsic value.  In chapter 4, I will argue that corporations are not created to partake in 
these “intrinsic values” but are created with the sole goal to pursue profit (I will argue this 
in Chapter 4 below). 
In Irwin Toy, the SCC affirmed the decision in Ford while broadening its 
application.  The SCC had to decide whether Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act, 
R.S.Q., c. C-40.1 violated Irwin Toy Ltd.’s freedom to express itself.  Section 248 of the 
Consumer Protection Act provided that “no person may make use of commercial 
advertising directed at persons under thirteen years of age” while section 249 provides 
that “directed to” takes into consider the “context of the presentation” including “the 
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nature and intended purpose of the goods advertised.”  Irwin Toy Ltd. was found by the 
appropriate Quebec authorities to be in violation of this provision and was fined in 
accordance with the statute (Irwin Toy 1002).  Irwin Toy then challenged the fine by 
initiating a Charter challenge arguing that sections 248 and 249 (among others) of the 
Consumer Protection Act violated its Charter protected right to expression under section 
2(b). 
The SCC concluded that “there is no sound basis on which to exclude 
commercial expression from the sphere of activity protected by section 2(b) of the 
Charter” (Irwin Toy 967).  The SCC went on to say that expression is fundamental 
“because in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity of ideas and 
opinions for their inherent value both to the community and to the individual” (Irwin Toy 
968).  In short, the SCC determined that Irwin Toy’s speech was consistent with the 
purpose of freedom of expression under the Charter. 
While Irwin Toy was ultimately unsuccessful in its Charter challenge before the 
SCC (it lost the case on the basis that it could not satisfy the section 1 analysis of the 
Charter), Irwin Toy was successful in entrenching freedom of expression for 
corporations.  In Devine, the SCC seemed to allow corporations freedom of expression 
by proxy because it ultimately served the interests of natural persons.  In Irwin Toy, the 
freedom did not come by way of proxy but belonged to corporations because of the 
inherent value of freedom of expression itself.  The decision in Irwin Toy squarely sets 
corporations alongside natural persons as bearers of some rights. 
The Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 case 
considered whether restrictions on advertising imposed by the College of Dental 
Surgeons on its members violated the section 2(b) of the Charter (Rocket 235).  The 
case involved two dentists, Howard Rocket and Brian Price, who were charged with 
violating certain regulations under a regulation of the Health Disciplines Act,  R.R.O. 
1980.  This regulation prevented advertising deemed “disgraceful, dishonourable or 
unprofessional” but permitted advertising that is limited to a certain size of advertising in 
a newspaper, not to appear more than three times in the newspaper, and allows 
information such as geographical location, name of the dentist, contact information and 
academic qualifications (among other things) (Rocket 236-238).  Drs. Rocket and Price 
created a corporation called Tridont Dental Centres, a large chain of dentist offices 
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across Canada.  They advertised with language indicating that their business model was 
the future of dentistry, how they had grown in size, and that they stay at the Holiday Inn 
when they travel because like their company, the Holiday Inn recognizes and responds 
to their changing needs (Rocket 236-237). 
The central issue, then, revolved around whether the regulation in the Health 
Disciplines Act violated section 2(b) of the Charter.  The SCC characterized this case as 
the need to strike a balance between “two values recognized in our society – the need to 
regulate the scope of professional advertising on the one hand and the value of free 
expression on the other”, a balance struck through a section 1 analysis (Rocket 241).  In 
recognizing that commercial expression is protected by the Charter, the court said that 
this type of expression must be considered in light of section 1.  To shed light on the 
issue, the SCC considered how the U.S. courts have addressed the U.S. First 
Amendment in the context of commercial expression.  While the U.S. Constitution lacks 
an equivalent section 1, the SCC pointed out that the U.S. courts have dealt with 
different types of expression differently (Rocket 242). 
Specifically, U.S. courts treat commercial expression with less rigour than other 
forms of expression.  The SCC pointed out the U.S. courts do the following:  
In order to justify a restriction on commercial speech, the state must establish 
that: (1) the restriction serves a substantial interest; (2) the regulatory measure 
directly advances that interest; and, (3) the restriction is no broader than 
necessary to advance that interest (Rocket 242). 
In Canada, the courts will determine first, whether the legislation in question violates the 
relevant section of the Charter.  Then, on a section 1 analysis, the court will consider 
whether the limitation is reasonable.  In the U.S., the equivalent “reasonable limit” is built 
in to whether or not there is a limitation on freedom of speech at all.  So, on the first step 
of the analysis, the SCC concluded that the relevant sections of the Regulation in 
question do indeed violate the right of Drs. Rocket and Price to freely express 
themselves (Rocket 245). 
Analogous to the way in which freedom of speech is constitutionally protected in 
the U.S., the SCC in this case said that section 1 of the Charter permits the courts in 
Canada to take “a sensible, case-oriented approach to the determination of their 
35 
constitutionality.  Placing the conflicting values in their factual and social context when 
performing the s. 1 analysis permits the courts to have regard to special features of the 
expression in question” (Rocket 246-247).  In short, “not all infringements of freedom of 
expression [are] equally serious” (Rocket 247).  For the purposes of this case, the SCC 
revealed the tension between a dentist’s economic interests in advertisement with the 
need for consumers to be given sufficient information to enable them to select a dentist 
(Rocket 247).  In considering this, the court compared the facts in Rocket to the facts in 
Irwin Toy.  In the latter case, the Quebec government put in place a provision to protect 
a vulnerable group, specifically children, from manipulative advertisements aimed at 
children.  The advertisement in Rocket is more about consumer choice than protecting a 
vulnerable group.  For this, and other reasons, the SCC concluded that the Regulation 
cannot be saved under section 1.  While this case protects the commercial expression of 
natural persons, it is instructive on how commercial expression is dealt with in Canada, 
whether or not the defendant is a corporation. 
The type of expression becomes important in the section 1 analysis.  It allows 
courts to extend stronger protections to types of expression that are deemed to be of 
higher value.  Conversely, the court can extend less protection to less valued types of 
expression, like expression for economic purposes (Rocket 247; Bauman 84).  So where 
the expression is purely economic, the court might be more apt to determine that there 
are reasonable limits (under a section 1 analysis) to that type of expression (Bauman 
84).  Despite the varying strength of protection granted to free expression under a 
section 1 analysis of the Charter, the SCC in Rocket once again concretized the 
protections afforded to corporations in the context of freedom of expression. 
One of the most important cases in the fight for freedom of expressions is the 
RJR-McDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (“RJR”)  Among the 
numerous constitutional issues that arose in this case, RJR -McDonald Inc. (“RJR”) 
challenged the Tobacco Products Control Act, S.C. 1988, c. 20, a federal statute aimed 
at protecting Canadians, especially young people, from the threat to health posed by 
tobacco through a prohibition on advertising and promotion of tobacco products (RJR 
224).  This case arose, in part, on the requirement that tobacco manufacturers display 
health warning on their packages (RJR 224).  RJR challenged the constitutionality of the 
Tobacco Products Control Act and claimed that it limited its freedom of expression under 
section 2(b) of the Charter (RJR 239). 
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The cases on freedom of expression, above, have shaped the debate around a 
corporation’s right to express itself.  Because of this case law, the Canadian Attorney 
General (the lawyers responsible for defending government legislation before the SCC) 
conceded at the outset that the Tobacco Products Control Act does infringe on RJR’s 
right to freedom of expression.  The SCC agreed citing such cases as Ford v. Quebec, 
Irwin Toy, and Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario as support for the 
proposition that commercial expression is protected under section 2(b) of the Charter 
(RJR 267).  However, after conducting a section 1 analysis, the court did say that certain 
types of expression attract a more robust freedom than others. 
Justice La Forest said that “the harm engendered by tobacco, and the profit 
motive underlying its promotion, place this form of expression as far from the “core” of 
freedom of expression values as prostitution, hate mongering, or pornography, and thus 
entitled it to a very low degree of protection.”  This type of advertising serves no 
“political, scientific or artistic ends; nor does it promote participation in the political 
process” (RJR 282-283).  All it does is serve the singular purpose of informing 
“customers about, and promote[s] the use of, a product that is harmful, and often fatal, to 
the consumers who use it” (RJR 283). 
In addition to the subject-matter of commercial expression, the courts also 
pointed out that tobacco corporations spend tens of millions of dollars on sophisticated 
advertising that “undermines their claim to freedom of expression protection because it 
creates an enormous power differential between these companies and tobacco 
consumers in the “marketplace of ideas”” (RJR 283).  Moreover, these companies spend 
additional money to allow them to employ the most advanced “social psychology 
techniques to convince potential buyers to buy their products” (RJR, 283). These 
arguments, by virtue of being made in the context of section 1, are about the balancing 
act the courts’ must strike between the Charter and what the legislation aims to protect.  
It is not about whether corporations ought to enjoy protections under the Charter.  As 
such, the court held that while the Tobacco Products Control Act infringes on RJR’s 
freedom of expression, the infringement is justifiable under section 1 of the Charter. 
The SCC went on to say that Parliament’s decision to ban tobacco advertising 
was in lock step with “over 20 democratic nations” that have adopted complete bans on 
tobacco advertising” (RJR 308).  That there was a need for government to regulate the 
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advertisement of tobacco seems patently reasonable; to allow a corporation to attempt 
to undo this legislation through the Charter is not.  However, the court’s commitment to 
the purposive analysis and the degree of protection granted under section 1 of the 
Charter has resulted in a detraction from what the courts ought to be doing, namely, 
whether corporations should be allowed to make this type of argument in the first place. 
The reasons in RJR represent a departure from previous arguments made by the 
SCC.  In earlier cases, the court argued that advertising confers a benefit on individuals 
because it helps them self-actualize or that freedom of expression has intrinsic value.  In 
RJR, the SCC (and in other, more recent freedom of expression cases) freed itself from 
the rigid application of freedom of expression by dropping these justifications in favour of 
one that sees that different types of expression ought to receive varying degrees of 
protection.  Despite the judicial concession that not all forms of expression deserve 
equal protection under section 1 of the Charter, the SCC in the RJR case continued on 
the same trajectory of previous SCC cases on the Charter right for freedom of 
expression of articulating a purposive approach to freedom of expression and continuing 
to classify corporations as bearers of that right.  This assumption was carried into the 
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (“Thomson 1998”), case. 
The Thomson 1998 case, another Charter challenge, involved two media 
corporations, Thomson Newspapers Company Limited and Southam Inc., which 
challenged section 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2.  This 
section of the Canada Elections Act “prohibits the broadcasting, publication, or 
dissemination of opinion survey results in the final days of a federal election campaign” 
(Thomson 1998 928).  Each of the above-named parties brought an application in 
Ontario’s court for a declaration that section 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act violates 
section 2(b), freedom of expression, and section 3, the right to vote, of the Charter.  The 
court skipped its discussion of section 3 of the Charter and instead settled the issue on 
the basis of section 2(b).  However, in doing so, the SCC did not comment on the fact 
that two corporations attempted to bring this claim.  There was no distinction about 
whether these parties had this right or whether they just had standing to bring this claim. 
The SCC did conclude, though, that section 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act 
does in fact violate the section 2(b) of the Charter (Thomson 1998 938).  The SCC said 
that “there can be no doubt that the publication of polling information, and more 
38 
specifically opinion survey results, is an activity that conveys meaning” and it “restricts 
freedom of expression by prohibiting the broadcasting, publication or dissemination of 
opinion survey result during the final three days of an election campaign” (Thomson 
1998 938).  In finding the Charter does not save the infringement of section 2(b), the 
court reinforced the idea that expression is to be considered in context.  That is, Charter 
protection “may vary depending on the nature of the expression at issue” and the “value 
of expression may be more easily outweighed by the government objective” (Thomson 
1998 943).  The SCC decided that the weight to be given to opinion polls is high 
because they are “an important part of the political discourse, as manifested by the 
attention such polls receive in the media and in the public at large, and by the fact that 
political parties themselves purchase and use such information” (Thomson 1998 943).  
And while the government’s objective through section 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act 
is “to prevent the distorting effect of public opinion survey results which are released late 
in the election where there is no long a sufficient opportunity to respond,” it was not a 
strong enough reason to override freedom of expression (Thomson 1998 946). 
The final case on corporate freedom of expression cases is the Little Sisters 
Book & Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (“Little 
Sisters”) case.  It involved Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium, a Vancouver-based 
bookstore and corporation that imported erotica from the United States, had its 
shipments seized or ordered returned, or delayed for months by Canadian Customs 
(Little Sisters 1136-1137).  Seizures included materials such as “magazines, videos and 
photographic essays” in addition to “books consisting entirely of text, including works by 
internationally acclaimed authors such as” Marguerite Duras and Jean Genet and 
included AIDS/HIV safe-sex education literature (Little Sisters 1138-1139).  Despite the 
conduct of Canadian Customs, Little Sisters was given no reason for the delays or 
returns. 
The conduct of Canadian Customs disrupted Little Sister’s business such as 
“planned book launches, causing loss of business to competitors stocking the same 
delayed or prohibited items, and items such as magazines, which depend for their shelf 
value on their timeliness” (Little Sisters 1140).  The SCC, however, said that this case is 
not about the financial losses that Little Sisters suffered; rather, it is about “the loss by a 
minority of the freedom to read and experience a broad range of writing and depictions, 
some of it claimed to be of high artistic value” (Little Sisters 1140).  But Canadian 
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Customs did not employ a consistent approach to all imported material.  On behalf of the 
SCC, Justice Binnie said that Little Sisters had identified 261 items that were detained 
between 1984 and 1994 and, among those items, some had been previously ruled 
acceptable for entry into Canada (Little Sisters 1140).  In short, the SCC accepted the 
idea that Little Sisters was the target of unfair treatment by Canada Customs. 
Canada Customs is entitled under section 99 of the Customs Act, R.S.C., 1985, 
which provides that Customs officers may inspect imported goods and mail and may do 
so without the consent of the addressee (Little Sisters 1143).  Pursuant to the 
classification scheme under the Customs Act, customs officials may deem something as 
“obscene” (Little Sisters 1143).  In response, Little Sisters initiated a Charter challenge 
on the basis that the relevant provisions in the Customs Act violated both section 2(b), 
freedom of expression, and section 15(1), the right to equality, under the Charter (Little 
Sisters 1147-1148 and 1151-1152).  Specifically, the issue surrounding freedom of 
expression required the courts to consider whether the empowerment of customs 
officials to determine what constitutes “obscene” infringes on their right to freedom of 
expression.  The specifics of the right to equality will be explained below. 
In relation to freedom of expression, Little Sisters believed that the flexibility built 
into the Customs Act, such that Customs officers have the discretion to determine what 
constitutes obscene, is the crux of the issue.  In answer to this, the SCC concluded that 
“the fact Parliament opted for the more flexible routes of delegated regulation and 
ministerial directive, is not, I think, a reason to invalidate the legislation itself” (Little 
Sisters 1196).  However, the SCC noted that Little Sisters was the target of Customs 
officers with little to no evidence to support claims that their goods were obscene.  There 
was “excessive and unnecessary prejudice” that included “failure by Customs to devote 
a sufficient number of officials to carry out the review of [Little Sister’s] publications in a 
timely way”, a “failure to adopt internal deadlines and related criteria for the expeditious 
review of expressive materials” and a “failure to provide [Little Sisters] with in a timely 
way with notice of the basis for detention of publications, the opportunity to make 
meaningful submission on a re-determination, and reasonable access to the disputed 
materials for that purpose” (Little Sisters 1202-1203).  All this led to a finding that the 
relevant sections of the Customs Act were applied in a manner contrary to section 2(b) 
of the Charter (Little Sisters 1203); however, they were saved by section 1 (Little Sisters 
1205). 
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The SCC in the Little Sisters case returned to the rationale that the protection of 
free expression to protect the interests of others (in this case, the readers of Little 
Sister’s literature).  Also, there fails to be in this case, like all the other cases on freedom 
of expression, a discussion on the source of that speech.  Instead, there is continued 
judicial reinforcement that commercial expression for corporations deserves protections 
under the Charter.  The legal discourse, then, revolves around the degree of protection 
the expression in question ought to receive under section 1 of the Charter.  This is based 
in large part on the SCC’s purposive analysis used to interpret and apply Charter-based 
rights and freedoms.  By uncovering the purpose of freedom of expression as having an 
intrinsic value, the SCC has found that corporations have interests that accord with 
these intrinsic values.  Case law surrounding freedom of expression has evolved from 
early cases that merely included “commercial expression” as protected speech with little 
concern for the source of the expression.  The SCC advanced its analysis by 
considering what effect granting freedom of expression had on individuals.  
Unfortunately, the advancement still identifies corporations as a member of “persons” 
that bear rights and freedoms under the Charter while leaving the strength of the 
protection granted to be decided in a section 1 analysis. 
In addition to the purposive approach in cases involving the Charter protected 
right to life, liberty and security of the person, the SCC also relies upon corporate theory 
to defend the notion that corporations are not sufficiently human to attain such rights.  
Again, the argument of whether freedom of expression includes commercial expression 
is not a concern for this thesis.  Rather, the problem requires an analysis on who 
deserves protection under the Charter.  The SCC failed to raise this problem but instead 
further concretized the application of freedom of expression to corporations by arguing in 
favour of commercial expression, generally, but they failed to distinguish the source of 
the expression. 
3.5. The Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person 
The purposive approach to interpreting the Charter has, as in the freedom of 
expression cases above, resulted in the granting of such rights to corporations.  
However, the SCC has also found that corporations are not sufficiently person-like to 
extend them certain Charter rights or freedoms.  The right to “life, liberty and security of 
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the person” found in section 7 of the Charter is one such right.  The first case to consider 
section 7 of the Charter was Irwin Toy. 
As already discussed, Irwin Toy challenged the constitutionality of Quebec’s 
Consumer Protection Act on the basis that it limited its right to freely express itself.  
Similarly, Irwin Toy argued that this same statute also violated its right to “life, liberty and 
security of the person” found in section 7 of the Charter.  The SCC considered whether 
corporations are able to claim such a right: “There is, however, an issue…namely 
whether corporations can invoke s. 7 of the Charter in their aid” (Irwin Toy 1001).  The 
SCC said that “a corporation cannot avail itself of the protection offered by s. 7 of the 
Charter” (Irwin Toy 1002-1003). 
In rejecting the argument that section 7 of the Charter applies to a corporation, 
the court said that in order to be successful, “the corporation would have to urge that its 
own life, liberty or security of the person was being deprived in a manner not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice” (Irwin Toy 1002)4.  The SCC 
turned to a discussion of economic rights under section 7 and determined that economic 
rights “are not within the perimeters of the s. 7 guarantee” (Irwin Toy 1003).  They did 
not rule out economic liberty as part of the section 7, however. 
According to the SCC, part of section 7 does allow for certain economic 
protection, like “social security, equal pay for equal work…and contract rights” (Irwin Toy 
1003; Bauman 85).  However, the SCC continued, “we do not, at this moment, choose to 
pronounce upon whether those economic rights fundamental to human life or survival 
are to be treated as though they are of the same ilk as corporate-commercial economic 
rights” and that “the inclusion of “security of the person” to be that a corporation’s 
economic rights find no constitutional protection in that section” (Irwin Toy 1003-1004) 
[emphasis in the original]. 
This move away from purely economic rights in section 7 of the Charter resulted 
in the SCC declaring that section 7 “was intended to confer protection on a singularly 
human level.  A plain, common sense reading of the phrase “Everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person” [under section 7 of the Charter] serves only to 
                                                
4 The principles of fundamental justice include the right to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure and self-incrimination (Thomson 1990 462). 
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underline the human element involved; only human beings can enjoy these rights” (Irwin 
Toy 1004).  Despite being successful in securing freedom of expression as a right that 
properly applies to corporations, the SCC concluded that corporations are not sufficiently 
person-like to attract protection under section 7. 
In Irwin Toy, the SCC provided a fulsome discussion about the non-applicability 
of section 7 to corporations.  However, the SCC gave short shrift to this same issue in 
Edwards (the case involving the constitutionality of Ontario’s Retail Business Holidays 
Act).  The SCC claimed that the appellant’s arguments on this issue were “without merit” 
(Edwards 786).  Additionally, the SCC failed to provide any discussion about the 
availability of this argument for corporations in Edwards.  Despite the brevity on whether 
section 7 of the Charter is available to corporations in the Edwards case, the SCC 
upheld the decision in Irwin Toy in Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of 
Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.R. 1 
425 (“Thomson 1990”).  However, because there were natural persons involved in the 
Thomson 1990 appeal, the SCC’s ruling indirectly benefited Thomson Newspapers. 
The Thomson 1990 case presented the SCC the opportunity to consider the 
Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, App. III and whether certain of its provisions 
infringed upon a person’s right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure 
(this issue will be addressed in chapter 3.6 below) and whether it infringed on one’s right 
to life, liberty and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter.  Thomson 
Newspapers was, at the time of this case, a large Canadian publication company and its 
management consisted of Brian Slaight, Executive Vice-President, Peter Bogart, Vice-
President Finance, and Paul Weeks, who was the controller.  These men were ordered 
to appear before the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to determine whether 
Thomson or any of its subsidiary companies had committed the offence of predatory 
pricing under section 34(1)(c) of the Combines Investigation Act (Thomson 1990 446). 
Section 17 of the Combines Investigation Act empowered the Commissioner to 
“subpoena, administer the oath and question” witnesses and, should the witness fail to 
testify, the Commission could make a finding of contempt and had the authority to 
punish that witness (Thomson 1990 443).  It also allowed the Director under the statute 
to compel an individual to be examined under oath and to produce records or other 
documents.  To do so, the Director did not need to hold any belief that a violation under 
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the statute occurred and was not required to disclose the grounds for obtaining the 
order.  Additionally, the order would be granted by way of an ex parte application and 
hearing (an ex parte hearing does not require all the parties to be present in order for the 
court to render a decision) (Thomson 1990 455-456).  While the SCC upheld the 
decision in Irwin Toy stating that section 7 of the Charter does not apply to corporations, 
the SCC said that section 7 was applicable in this case since the Thomson 1990 case 
involved not only a corporation but the above-mentioned managers.  Furthermore, if the 
court found that the relevant sections of the Combines Investigation Act were 
inconsistent with section 7 of the Charter, then section 17 of the Combines Investigation 
Act would be of “no force or effect in respect of corporations” (Thomson 1990 459). 
In determining this, the SCC found that the “right against non-compellability and 
the right against self-incrimination are part of the principles of fundamental justice” under 
section 7 of the Charter (Thomson 1990 470).  The SCC concluded that section 17 of 
the Combines Investigation Act violated section 7 of the Charter to the extent that it 
allows the “Director to compel suspects to testify in an investigatory proceeding so as to 
build up a case against themselves through their own self-incriminating testimony and 
evidence” and cannot be saved by section 1 (Thomson 1990 486 and 490). 
In addressing whether the appellant, Thomson Newspapers, could initiate a 
Charter challenge, Justice Lamer stated that section 7, the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person, of the “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is engaged 
because human beings as well as a corporation are directly involved” (Thomson 1990 
442).  The SCC was clear that if there was a violation of section 7 for a natural person, 
the corporation would derive an indirect benefit because the offending provision would 
be deemed invalid and of no force.  In R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] 3 
S.C.R. 199 (“Wholesale”), there was an absence of natural people involved in the case 
so the SCC returned to its justification that corporations have standing to challenge 
legislation under section 7 of the Charter. 
Wholesale Travel Group Inc. was found to be in violation of sections 36(1)(a), 
36(5) and 37.3(2) of the federal Competition Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 for false or 
misleading advertising.  Wholesale Travel Group was a travel agency that advertised 
vacations at wholesale prices.  The implication, according to the Crown, was that 
consumers were led to believe that the price of the vacation to the customer was the 
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price that Wholesale Travel paid, which was not the case.  Therefore, the Crown alleged 
this constituted false or misleading advertising (Wholesale 171).  The issues that arose 
in this case were whether section 37.3(2) of the Competition Act violated either or both 
of sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter: the former for imposing absolute liability and the 
latter for imposing a reverse onus (Wholesale 183 and 198). 
In considering this, the SCC looked at whether a corporation had standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute and, if it could, if it were capable of benefiting 
from a successful challenge (Wholesale 178-179).  The SCC briefly considered an 
argument that even if a corporation had standing to bring a constitutional challenge and 
was successful in that challenge, that the success of that case would only confer a 
benefit to natural persons and not corporations (Wholesale 180).  The SCC rejected this 
argument (however, this is an argument I will make in chapter 6 below). 
The SCC cited section 52 of the Charter and said “section 52 sets out the 
fundamental principle of constitutional law that the Constitution is supreme.  The 
undoubted corollary to be drawn from this principle is that no one can be convicted of an 
offence under an unconstitutional law (Big M Drug Mart 313).  Allowing an 
unconstitutional provision in a statute to prevail for corporations “would not accord with 
this Court’s general approach to s. 52(1)” (Wholesale 180). 
To illustrate this point, the SCC cited R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 in 
which Dr. Morgentaler was administering abortions contrary to the Criminal Code, RSC 
1970, c. C-34 and the Crown proceeded with charges against him.  By way of public 
interest standing, Dr. Morgentaler argued that the provision in the Criminal Code 
banning abortions violated the section 7 Charter rights of women.  The SCC agreed and 
this Criminal Code provision was struck down.  Even though Dr. Morgentaler was a man 
and his right to life, liberty and security of the person and his right was therefore not 
directly at stake, he was given standing to make such an argument.  The SCC agreed 
with his argument and deemed relevant provision of the Criminal Code to be invalid 
(Wholesale 181).  The argument that a man can bring this argument on behalf of women 
is hardly analogous to corporations bringing arguments on behalf of natural persons 
despite the fact that both men and corporations benefit.  I will address this in chapter 6 
below. 
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On this basis, the SCC concluded that Wholesale Travel did indeed have 
standing to bring this constitutional challenge and could benefit from it (Wholesale 181).  
The Competition Act applies to both natural persons and corporations and, if the 
challenge is a successful one, the provision must be struck down in favour of both 
(Wholesale 181).  Once the SCC concluded that Wholesale Travel had standing to 
argue this case, it was successful in demonstrating that section 37.3(2) of the 
Competition Act did indeed violate section 7 of the Charter.  Despite this, the SCC 
upheld section 37.3(2) on the basis that it constituted a reasonable limit under section 1 
of the Charter (Wholesale 190 and 195). 
The above cases are clear in relation to section 7 of the Charter: corporations are 
not sufficiently person-like to claim the right to life, liberty and security of the person.  
This is scarcely problematic for corporations.  Where the goal of a Charter challenge by 
a corporation is to avoid liability, whether or not the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person applies to corporations or whether corporations simply have standing is 
irrelevant.  Where mere standing is granted and the challenge is successful, the overall 
effect is the same. 
Simply declaring that a corporation is not entitled to a particular right or freedom 
under the purpose approach or corporate theorizing fails to properly articulate the 
differences between individuals and corporations.  To fully articulate this difference, 
Canadian courts should state that legislation can violate the Charter for natural persons 
yet still continue to be valid in their application to corporations.  I will make this argument 
in chapter 6 below. 
3.6. The Right to be Secure against Unreasonable Search 
and Seizure 
The case law regarding one’s right to life, liberty and security of the person, 
above, dealt directly with the question of the applicability of the Charter to corporate 
persons.  In Hunter v. Southam Inc. and Thomson 1990., the first two cases under 
consideration involving the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, 
the application of the Charter to corporations was implied.  In these two cases, the SCC 
undertook a purposive analysis; however, it isn’t until the final two cases in this section 
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that the SCC articulated the fact that corporations have an interest that accord with the 
purpose of the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. 
In Hunter v. Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (“Southam”), the first in a short 
line of cases dealing with a person’s “right to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure” under section 8 of the Charter.  In Southam the SCC had to decide whether 
sections 10(1) and 10(3) of the federal Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 
authorized unreasonable search and seizures in violation of section 8 of the Charter.  
This federal statute was enacted to counteract the emergence of a few people who 
controlled enormous financial entities (Thomson 1990 453).  At issue in the Southam 
case were the relevant sections of the Combines Investigation Act which permitted 
authorities to enter any premise should those authorities have lawful grounds (Southam 
148).  Furthermore, the authorities were authorized by the Combines Investigation Act to 
make copies or remove any documents that could be evidence.  On April 13, 1982, the 
Director under the Combines Investigation Act authorized officials to enter the property 
of the Edmonton Journal, which was a division of Southam Inc., and examine documents 
on the grounds that Southam Inc. had engaged in anti-competitive behaviour (Southam 
148-149; Bauman 78). 
In making its determination of whether the legislation in this case violated section 
8 of the Charter, the SCC said the purpose of section 8 is to protect one’s right to privacy 
only when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (Southam 159).  The facts of this 
case demonstrated that Southam was subjected to a search that had a “breathtaking 
sweep” which was “tantamount to a licence to roam at large on the premises of Southam 
Inc.” (Southam 150).  Because of the scope of the search and the wording of sections 
10(1) and 10(3) of the Combines Investigation Act granted such broad investigatory 
powers, the SCC concluded that the legislation did not accord with the purpose of 
section 8 and it could not be saved by section 1 of the Charter (Southam 169 - 170). 
In doing so, the SCC failed to argue how the purpose of section 8 of the Charter 
fits at all with a corporation.  If the purpose of section 8 is to protect one’s right to 
privacy, it is unclear how a corporation has such an interest.  As Bauman points out, the 
SCC provided no distinction between the expectation of privacy between a human and a 
corporation (79).  Allowing corporate protections under the Charter likens corporations to 
humans.  The Supreme Court has consistently articulated individual rights and freedoms 
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in “human terms” but has failed to articulate what this interest is in relation to section 8 of 
the Charter (Bauman 79).  The SCC did not take the opportunity to articulate this when it 
heard the Thomson 1990 case in which this issue once again emerged. 
In Thomson 1990, the SCC had to determine whether section 17 of the 
Combines Investigation Act violated section 8 of the Charter (Thomson 1990 447).  
Specifically, the SCC considered whether 17(4) of the Combines Investigation Act, which 
could compel an individual to produce books, papers and records before the 
Commission, violated section 8 of the Charter.  The SCC determined that this section 
includes the protection of privacy but goes beyond the “inviolability of his body” to 
include a person’s property including books, records and other documents (Thomson 
1990 491 and 492).  The SCC concluded that the impugned section of the Combines 
Investigation Act did violate section 8 of the Charter and it could not be saved by section 
1.  While the SCC did not explicitly say that corporations have an interest that accords 
with the purpose of section 8, in R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 
(“McKinlay”) the SCC indicated that corporations do have such an interest. 
McKinlay involved two companies incorporated under the law of Ontario: 
McKinlay Transport Ltd. and C.T. Transport Inc.  In 1992, Revenue Canada initiated an 
income tax audit.  In accordance with section 231(3) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 
1952, c. 148, Revenue Canada issued a letter to the two appellants demanding the 
production of information and documents in support of the audit (McKinlay 631).  The 
appellants refused to comply with the order claiming that it violated their section 8 
Charter right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure (McKinlay 631 and 
636). 
In McKinlay, the Court reiterated its purposive approach to section 8 stating that 
“the underlying value to be protected by s. 8 of the Charter was the individual’s interest 
in privacy” but went on to say that that protection was limited to a “reasonable 
expectation” (McKinlay 641).  Justice Wilson said that judges must take a “flexible and 
purposive approach to s. 8 of the Charter” (McKinlay 647).  This flexible and purposive 
approach resulted in the SCC finding that section 231(3) of the Income Tax Act did not 
violate the appellants’ right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.  The 
SCC found that a balancing act must be struck between “the state interest in monitoring 
compliance with the legislation” and “an individual’s privacy interest” (McKinlay 649).  
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Since the Income Tax Act did not permit the invasion into a person’s home or business 
premises but simply called upon a company to produce documents, the expectation of 
privacy was “reasonably low” (McKinlay 649-650).  Building upon this case, the SCC 
provided the clearest statement that corporations, like natural persons, are entitled to 
privacy under section 8 of the Charter in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Lessard, 
[1991] 3 R.C.S. (“Lessard”) 
The Lessard case involved Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (the “CBC”) 
camera crew who filmed some people who were damaging a post office in Pointe-Claire, 
Quebec (Lessard 440).  Parts of the film were broadcast on the CBC.  The police were 
not present at the time the people damaged the post office; however, after the 
broadcast, Montreal police became aware of the tapes and requested authorization from 
a justice of the peace to search the tapes (Lessard 440).  After granting the warrant, 
officers searched the CBC premises in Montreal and seized five tapes containing 
footage from the vandalism (Lessard 441).  The CBC took legal action to quash the 
warrant. 
The SCC upheld the decision to issue the warrant (Lessard 447).  In doing so, 
the court said that “the search of any premises constitute a significant intrusion on the 
privacy of individuals and corporations alike.  Family and business confidences which 
are irrelevant to the crime under investigation may be reviewed by the unsympathetic 
eyes of a stranger.  A search is always intrusive, upsetting and to some degree 
disruptive of the life or business of the individual subjected to the search” (Lessard 444).  
The court continued that even though the police have satisfied the statutory conditions 
upon which a warrant may be approved, the degree of privacy is also an important 
consideration.  “For example, a greater degree of privacy may be expected in a home 
than in commercial premises” and, within the context of commercial premises, there are 
some that are deserving of a greater degree of privacy (Lessard 444). 
Certain corporations, such as those in the business of media, “are entitled to 
particularly careful consideration, both as to the issuance of a search warrant and as to 
the conditions that may be attached to a warrant to ensure that any disruption of the 
gathering and dissemination of news is limited as much as possible” (Lessard 444). 
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Southam and Thomson 1990 started the lineage of cases relating to the right to 
be secure against unreasonable search as seizure without any reference to the claimant 
being a corporation.  However, the purposive approach that takes into account the 
interests of corporations seems to be the implicit rationale.  In McKinlay and Lessard, the 
SCC tackles the question of whether the claimant, as a corporation, is entitled to such a 
right because it has an interest in privacy, the SCC determined that corporations are 
able to avail itself of section 8.  Like the freedom of expression cases where the SCC 
articulated how certain types of speech may not be granted the same protections as 
others, so too the SCC determined that corporations are entitled to a diminished right to 
privacy in relation to natural persons.  In the following case, however, there was no such 
diminishment of the right.  The SCC, relying again on a purposive analysis to the 
Charter, concluded that the right to be tried in a reasonable time is a right that belongs to 
corporations in the R. v. CIP Inc., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 843 (“CIP”) case. 
3.7. The Right to Be Tried Within a Reasonable Time 
In CIP, an employee of CIP Inc. was killed in an industrial accident on CIP’s 
property.  After an investigation, CIP and three of its employees were charged with an 
offence under Ontario’s Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 321 for 
failure to “ensure that the control switches or other control mechanisms on a die press 
were locked out” (CIP 847).  After a series of adjournments, counsel for CIP objected 
asserting that its client’s right under section 11(b) of the Charter, the right to be tried 
within a reasonable time, had been violated.  In addressing whether CIP’s right to be 
tried within a reasonable time was infringed, the SCC first addressed the issue of 
whether a corporate accused has such a right (CIP 851). 
Once again taking a purposive approach to the Charter, the SCC found that the 
purpose behind section 11(b) is to protect the individual’s rights and requirements of 
fundamental justice (CIP 855).  The SCC detailed the concerns over prolonged trials 
such as the memories of witnesses will fade over time and even a loss of witnesses 
(they may move out of the country, become sick, die or otherwise become unable to 
testify) (CIP 856).  On this basis, the SCC said that the “availability of witnesses and the 
reliability of their testimony could have a significant impact upon the appellant’s ability to 
put forward [a] defence” and that the corporate appellant “has a legitimate interest in 
being tried within a reasonable amount of time” as the “right to a fair trial is fundamental 
50 
to our adversarial system” (CIP 856).  By logical extension, since corporations may be 
an appellant, the right to be tried within a reasonable time ought to be extended to them 
to ensure that the courts avoid these concerns. 
In short, the SCC concluded that corporations have an interest that accords with 
the purpose of section 11(b) of the Charter and the integrity of our legal system relies 
upon adherence to this right.  However, the SCC ruled against CIP because the cause of 
the delay was due to CIP’s decision to pursue appeals (CIP 864).  While CIP was 
unsuccessful in having its case dismissed because the trial was not conducted in a 
reasonable time, CIP was successful in arguing that a corporation can avail itself of 
section 11(b) of the Charter.  Corporate persons have an interest in being tried within a 
reasonable timeframe.  In the next case, however, the SCC recognizes how a 
corporation is not a person in every instance in R. v. Amway Corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 21 
(“Amway”).  In arriving at this conclusion, the SCC seems to be doing both a purposive 
analysis and corporate theory. 
3.8. Compulsion to be a Witness 
The Amway case arose because the federal Crown began a civil action against 
Amway for its alleged breach of the federal Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10 (Amway 
25-26).  The federal Crown believed that Amway made false declarations with respect to 
the value of imported goods in an attempt to avoid having to pay duties (Amway 25-26).  
As part of these proceedings, the Crown requested that Amway produce one of its 
officers to be questioned during examination for discovery (Amway 26).  In an attempt to 
avoid having its own officer discovered, Amway claimed that it had the right against self-
incrimination under section 11(c) of the Charter (Amway 26). 
Section 11(c) of the Charter provides that “any person charged with an offence 
has the right not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in 
respect of the offence.”  Amway’s legal counsel refused because it claimed it was “not 
required to produce any person to be examined for discovery in view of s. 11(c) of the” 
Charter (Amway 26).  In respect of the Charter claim, the SCC said that a respondent 
must satisfy three criteria: that it is a person; charged with an offence; and, is a witness 
in proceedings against that person (Amway 37).   
51 
In respect of the first criteria, the SCC said that “it is neither necessary nor 
desirable in this case to decide that under no circumstances may a corporation avail 
itself of the provisions of s. 11” but concluded that “a corporation cannot be a witness 
and therefore cannot come within s. 11(c)” (Amway 37).  In support of its conclusion, the 
SCC cited the R. v. N. M. Paterson and Sons Ltd., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 697 (“Paterson”) 
case.  While this case is a pre-Charter decision, the SCC said any officer of a 
corporation that is called to testify is a witness and is a person distinct from the 
corporation (Amway 37; Paterson 691). 
The SCC in Amway agreed with the SCC in Paterson by finding that anyone, 
such as an officer, who testifies on behalf of a corporation, is doing so as a separate 
person.  This is also in keeping with the law developed in the Salomon case that 
corporations are separate legal persons.  In arriving at this conclusion, the SCC took a 
“purposive interpretation to s. 11(c)” and said that this section of the Charter is designed 
to “protect the individual against the affront to dignity and privacy inherent in a practice 
which enables the prosecution to force the person charged to supply the evidence out of 
his or her own mouth” (Amway 40).  However, “it would strain the interpretation of s. 
11(c) [of the Charter] if an artificial entity were held to be a witness” and that an 
interpretation in favour of Amway would be an unjustifiable linguistic “metamorphosis” 
(Amway 39).  As such, under the purposive analysis, a corporation does not have an 
interest that accords the purpose of section 11(c) of the Charter on the basis that 
corporations cannot speak for themselves. 
3.9. The Right to be Presumed Innocent 
In determining whether the Charter right to be presumed innocent under section 
11(d) applied to corporations, the SCC in Wholesale (this case was discussed in chapter 
3.5 above) ignored the use of the purposive approach and the corporate theory 
approach and relied on standing to permit a corporation to challenge legislation under 
the Charter.  To reiterate, Wholesale was charged under the Competition Act for false or 
misleading advertisement.  In response, Wholesale challenged certain provisions of the 
Competition Act for their ostensible violation of the corporation’s right to life, liberty and 
security of the person.  Additionally, Wholesale challenged section 37.3(2) of the 
Competition Act claiming that it created a reverse onus on the accused and therefore 
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infringed on one’s right to be presumed innocent under section 11(d) of the Charter 
(Wholesale 158). 
The purpose of section 11(d) of the Charter is to protect one’s right to be 
presumed innocent “where an accused faces penal consequences” because “an 
individual must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” and that the “state must 
bear the burden of proof” (Wholesale 196).  This right is available to anyone prosecuted 
by the state for anything ranging from serious crimes to less serious regulatory offences 
(Wholesale 196).  As such, the SCC concluded that the language in section 37.3(2) does 
indeed impose a reverse onus on an accused.  Moreover, this limitation did not present 
a reasonable limit on the right to be presumed innocent under section 1 of the Charter 
and section 37.3(2) was deemed to be of no force or effect (Wholesale 198 and 205). 
The SCC relied on the idea of standing to justify a corporation’s use of the 
Charter resulting in an indirect benefit to corporations.  The SCC did not want to 
separate corporate persons from natural persons for the purpose of the Charter 
because, in their view, the courts should never convict anyone of an offence when the 
law is unconstitutional (Wholesale 179).  The SCC did say, however, that if the 
legislation was drafted so that it applied exclusively to corporations that corporations 
might not be able to benefit from the Charter right to be presumed innocent (I will expand 
upon this in chapter 6 below).  However, since the section 37.3(2) of the Competition Act 
applied to both natural and corporate persons, the overall benefit of gaining standing 
resulted in Wholesale, a corporation, to avoid liability under the statute. 
3.10. The Right to Equality 
As discussed above in chapter 3.4, the Little Sisters case dealt with, in part, the 
concern that the Customs Act violated its right to expression.  Additionally, Little Sisters 
argued that the Customs Act was applied by customs officers in an unequal manner and 
thus the impugned provisions of the Act violated section 15(1), the right to equality, of 
the Charter (Little Sisters 1152).  Little Sisters argued that the Canadian Customs Act is 
the source of the discrimination in that it “operates with disproportionate and 
discriminatory effects on the gay and lesbian community” (Little Sisters 1182).  After a 
discussion of the test required by the common law to determine whether the Customs 
Act was, in effect, discriminatory, the SCC held that neither its content nor its effects 
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result in discrimination based on sexual orientation (Little Sisters 1189).  In short, the 
SCC held that the Customs Act did not discriminate under section 15(1) of the Charter. 
A corporation would likely never be successful in Canada in a Charter challenge 
involving section 15.  There are specific grounds upon which such a challenge can take 
place and it is unlikely that a court would say that a corporation could ever be 
discriminated on the basis of these grounds, such as race, sex, sexual orientation, 
religion, or colour.  It is worth noting that Little Sisters, as a corporation, did not claim 
that it was the subject of discriminatory treatment.  Rather, it was bringing this claim on 
the basis that it discriminated against a certain class of persons, namely the gay and 
lesbian community.  This was an attempt to circumvent conclusions made by the SCC in 
cases such as Irwin Toy that corporations are not sufficiently person-like to attract 
certain Charter rights and/or freedoms including the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person.  Counsel for Little Sisters likely anticipated an argument by analogy whereby 
the SCC would find that discrimination can only occur on grounds that affect a natural 
person.  Therefore, appealing to its customer base of natural persons, while 
unsuccessful, did not truly test the application of section 15(1) of the Charter to 
corporations. 
Similarly, it would be difficult for a natural person to bring a section 15 claim 
against the government for treating corporations differently than natural persons.  For 
example, corporations enjoy a tax rate that is lower than corporations.  A natural person 
would not be able to argue that such a tax rate is discriminatory as corporations are not 
persons that have characteristics that accord with the grounds for discrimination under 
section 15 of the Charter. 
3.11. Concluding Remarks 
Whether or not corporations have been granted rights under the Charter is a 
moot point.  Whether a corporation is actually granted a right or freedom or whether it is 
granted standing to make an argument, corporate litigants are still able to benefit from 
having unconstitutional provisions struck down by the court.  This allows corporations to 
limit their liability under legislation through Charter challenges.  However, no matter what 
the approach is, the SCC has hypostatized corporations. 
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Utilizing the purposive analysis, the SCC first determines the purpose of a 
particular right or freedom under the Charter then the court determines whether the 
corporation has an interest that accords with that purpose.  Ascribing interests to 
something created by law renders that thing as having a concrete existence, as a fact 
out-there-in-the-world that requires language to be used accurately.  And with standing, 
the SCC has said no unconstitutional law is enforceable, even against a corporation (see 
the Wholesale case in chapter 3.10).  In chapter 5, I will use Wittgenstein’s early 
philosophy of language to argue how each of these approaches to articulating Charter 
rights and freedoms renders the corporation as something concrete and real that 
deserves, at the very least, the court’s time to determine whether a corporation bears 
certain rights.  Before I make this argument, I shall set out in chapter 4 just what a 
corporation, in law, actually is: it is simply a fiction created by the positive law to 
generate wealth.  To support this, I will cite case and statutory law. 
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Chapter 4.  
 
The Corporate Purpose: Wealth Maximization with 
the Aid of Charter Rights 
In the cases listed in chapter 3, judges have scarcely addressed what, at bottom, 
a corporate person is.  While there has been recognition in case and statutory law that 
corporations are persons and a lot of argument about whether or not corporations should 
get certain rights or freedoms under the Charter, an exploration of what a corporation is 
and how it is managed in the context of the Charter is crucial.  Such an exploration will 
reveal why granting Charter rights and freedoms, as a general rule, is unwise.  In 
chapter 5, I will argue how philosophy of language, specifically Wittgenstein’s late ideas 
on the subject, can provide clarity around the issue of whether corporations deserve 
Charter rights. 
Corporations are simply created to make investors – shareholders and creditors, 
for example – money.  Indeed, ensuring profitability of corporations is not just the job of 
officers and directors but it is their legal duty, which has been established in statutory 
and common law.  The SCC has determined, through the lens of corporate statutes, that 
directors and officers of corporations have the duty to make the corporation in which 
they serve profitable. 
This profit motive derives from a directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duty, which is 
the duty to act in the best interest of another.  In the case of corporate managers, they 
must act in the best interest of the corporation  This duty arises out of statutory law at 
both the federal and provincial levels.5  The seminal case on this issue is Peoples 
Department Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (“Peoples”).  In eastern Canada, there 
used to exist Wise Department Stores Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Peoples 
Department Stores Inc. (Peoples 467).  The three Wise brothers, Lionel, Ralph and 
Harold, were majority shareholders in and directors and officers of Wise Department 
Stores (Peoples 467).  Marks & Spencer owned Peoples Departments Stores and 
                                                
5 See section 122(1)(a) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44; section 
142(1)(a) of the British Columbia Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57; and, section 
134(1)(a) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c B.16, for example. 
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ultimately sold its interest in the department store to Wise Department Stores (Peoples 
468). 
As part of the agreement for the sale of Peoples Department Store, Marks & 
Spencer demanded that the Wise brothers not amalgamate Wise with Peoples 
Department Stores.  This required them, in part, to maintain separate inventory (Peoples 
469 - 470).  However, the inventory of both department stores was housed in the same 
location causing a comingling of inventory.  This comingling resulted in inaccurate record 
keeping for each of Wise and Peoples Department Stores (Peoples 471).  To settle this 
issue, Lionel Wise consulted with Wise Department Stores vice-president of 
administration and finance, David Clement.  Clement recommended a joint inventory 
procurement policy that required Peoples Department Store to make all purchases from 
North America while Wise Department Stores would be the sole purchaser for all 
overseas goods (Peoples 471).  Approximately 82% of the total inventory was 
purchased within North America.  As a result, Peoples Department Store extended a 
significant amount of credit to Wise Department Stores (Peoples 471). 
Despite the procurement policy, Peoples Department Store entered into 
bankruptcy (Peoples 473).  While some of Peoples’ creditors were paid, there were a 
number of unsatisfied creditors and these creditors took issue with the decision by the 
directors to enter into the joint inventory procurement policy (Peoples 471 and 473).  
These creditors then initiated litigation against the Wise brothers, personally, claiming 
that the three Wise brothers favoured the interests of Wise Department Stores over 
Peoples to the detriment of its creditors (Peoples 473). 
In doing so, the creditors argued, the Wise brothers, as directors of Wise 
Department Stores, breached their fiduciary duty to the creditors under section 122(1)(a) 
of the Canada Business Corporations Act.  This provision requires that directors and 
officers of a company “act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of 
the company” (Canada Business Corporations Act section 122(1)(a)).  Before 
determining whether or not the directors of Wise Departments Store breached their 
fiduciary duty to the creditors, the SCC first needed to determine whether the directors 
(and officers) of a company ever owe a fiduciary duty to creditors. 
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On its way to answering that question, the SCC considered the content of the 
fiduciary duty in the context of company law.  This duty means that directors and officers 
must work to maximize the value of the corporation (Peoples 481).  Accordingly, the 
fiduciary duty can only be owed to the corporation.  The SCC said that directors and 
officers may consider other factors when managing the best interests of the corporation, 
such as the “interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, 
governments and the environment” (Peoples 482).  Despite this caveat (which is set out 
in the Canada Business Corporations Act at section 122(1.1)), the SCC concluded, in no 
uncertain terms, that even when the “various shifts in interests that naturally occur as a 
corporation’s fortunes rise and fall do not, however, affect the content of the fiduciary 
duty.”  “At all times, directors and officers owe their fiduciary obligation to the 
corporation” (Peoples 482).  This leaves no room for directors and officers to act in the 
best interests of others as the “interests of the corporation are not to be confused with 
the interests of the creditors or those of any other stakeholders” (Peoples 482 and 483).  
On this issue, the SCC concluded that the Wise brothers, as directors, could not have 
breached their fiduciary duty to the creditors of Wise Department Stores because that 
duty is only ever owed to the corporation. 
The SCC had another opportunity to deal with the fiduciary duty in the context of 
corporations in BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (“BCE”).  This case 
arose out of an offer to purchase all of the shares of BCE Inc., a telecommunications 
company (BCE 572).  Bell Canada was a wholly owned subsidiary of BCE and the sale 
of BCE was to be completed through a leveraged buyout of which Bell Canada was to 
be liable for the debt of the leveraged buyout (BCE 573).  Debentureholders of Bell 
Canada opposed the transaction on the ground that it would diminish the value of their 
investment by approximately 20% (BCE 573).  After the transaction was complete, the 
value of the debentures was indeed downgraded (BCE 577). 
To recoup losses, the debentureholders began litigation against the directors of 
BCE through the oppression remedy.6  These debentureholders argued that the decision 
                                                
6 An oppression remedy, provided for by provincial and federal statutes, affords a broad spectrum 
of stakeholders of a corporation the right to challenge decisions of directors that are oppressive – 
decisions that are either illegal or unfair – based on the reasonable expectations of those 
stakeholders (BCE 564).  The oppression remedy acts as an exception to the general rule that 
the party who is the beneficiary of the fiduciary duty is the only party that can enforce the duty.  
Corporate law necessarily requires a deviation from this principle because directors are, in fact, 
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of the board of directors to enter into the transaction to sell its shares resulting in a 
downgrade in the value of the debentures constituted unfair treatment thus violating the 
directors’ fiduciary duty to the corporation (BCE 583). 
To determine whether the directors of BCE acted in an oppressive manner, the 
SCC discussed the nature of a director’s and officer’s fiduciary duty to the corporation.  
The SCC said that the fiduciary duty is a “broad, contextual concept” which requires 
management to consider the “long-term interests of the corporation” (BCE 584).  How 
this duty is fulfilled is context dependent but, at a minimum, always requires directors to 
satisfy its statutory obligations (BCE 584).  The SCC in BCE affirmed its decision in the 
Peoples case that directors and officers may consider the interests of others including 
shareholders, employee, and creditors when fulfilling its fiduciary duty (BCE 585).  But 
while the interests of the corporation and its shareholders (as well as other stakeholders) 
are often aligned, they may diverge (BCE 597).  When such a divergence takes place, 
the duty remains clear: directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation (BCE 584).  The 
SCC concluded that the BCE directors did not engage in oppressive conduct in its 
decision to enter into the transaction to sell its shares and therefore did not breach their 
fiduciary duty to the company. 
Both the Peoples and BCE cases conclude that directors and officers must 
always act in the best interest of the corporation in which they serve.  To act in the best 
interests of the corporation is to maximize its wealth.  While this duty may be fulfilled by 
directors through a consideration of the interests of other stakeholder – creditors, 
government, the environment – often times the interests of the corporation and other 
stakeholders diverges.  Such divergence does not require the directors of a corporation 
to juggle the various and divergent interests of the corporation and its stakeholders.  
Rather, the duty only ever requires that the directors of a corporation act in such a way 
that allows that corporation to maximize its wealth. 
From the perspective of internal corporate governance as discussed in Peoples 
and BCE, corporations are very different types of persons than natural persons.  Of 
course, natural persons may be interested in maximizing their personal wealth.  There is, 
                                                                                                                                              
the natural persons who act for and make decisions on behalf of corporations.  In light of this, 
directors are unlikely to ever bring a breach of fiduciary duty against themselves (BCE 585).  To 
address this problem, the law has allowed for stakeholders to bring an oppression remedy 
against the decisions made by a corporation or its directors (BCE 586). 
59 
however, a fundamental difference in the pursuit of wealth between a natural and 
corporate person.  The former may pursue wealth maximization.  Those who manage 
the latter are duty bound to pursue it.  Additionally, natural persons may have a wide 
variety of interests: self-actualization, acquisition of knowledge, pursuing hobbies; having 
a family, and so on.  Corporations only have one interest: wealth maximization.  To grant 
rights and freedoms under the Charter to corporations, whose only interest in society is 
to pursue a profit, is absurd.  To the extent that a corporation can be said to have an 
interest, it is only in this pursuit. 
The legal duty of directors and officers to maximize wealth leaves little room for 
achieving what Joel Bakan believes was the original purpose of a corporation: “a state-
created tool for advancing social and economic policy” (158).  In fact, the legal duty to 
generate wealth places the advancement of social interests by corporations at the mercy 
of wealth generation.  A corporation can engage in socially responsible behaviour so 
long as the behaviour leads to profit for the corporation.  Socially responsible corporate 
behaviour for any other purpose would impose liability upon directors and officers for 
breaching their fiduciary duty to the corporation. 
The promotion of social interests through corporate social responsibility is a 
paradox (Bakan 110).  Any corporate policy that has as its goal to promote the 
improvement of social circumstances – through donations, corporate sponsorship, or 
social venture philanthropy – is only justified so long as it results in a profit to the 
corporation.  Otherwise, using corporate money to engage in corporate social 
responsibility is illegal and, to some like Milton Friedman, immoral.  The profits of a 
corporation belong to shareholders and management has no legal or moral right to use 
that money for socially responsible means (Bakan 34 and 37).  Corporations “can do 
good” so long as it helps “itself to do well” (Bakan 50).  To insist, through the purposive 
approach in Charter litigation, that corporations have interests is inconsistent with the 
body of law that says that officers and directors must only act to maximize its wealth. 
The corporation has been analogized to a person but not the kind of person that 
the SCC refers to.  Rather, critics have likened a corporation to a psychopath or, more 
literarily, to Frankenstein.  Because of their pursuit of profit, Bakan famously referred to 
corporations as psychopathic.  Like psychopaths, corporations are deeply self-interested 
and lack the ability to empathize (Bakan 56).  “Unlike human beings who inhabit [a 
60 
corporation], the corporation is singularly self-interested and unable to feel genuine 
concern for others in any context” (Bakan 56).  Psychopaths are also manipulative, a 
trait that is shared by corporations and, (Bakan 57). 
One of the ways that corporations manipulate consumers is through advertising 
to appear more human.  In the Ford case, the SCC recognized that commercial 
expression is for little more than manipulating people into making certain economic 
decisions (Ford 763).  However, corporate expression through advertising is not limited 
to manipulating people into buying what that corporation has to sell.  It also attempts to 
manipulate the public into believing that corporations are human.  For example, General 
Motors ran an ad campaign that attempted to personalize their corporate image by 
calling it a family (Bakan 18).  AT&T used shareholders in its advertisements declaring 
that it is owned by the people (Bakan 17-18).  While these claims bear some truth, they 
are manipulative marketing forces generated to cast a human light on corporations as a 
way to cover up the fact that they are, at bottom, a vehicle to make profit.  While profit is, 
at times, a positive result of corporations, this psychopathy is the direct result of the 
Canadian legal system’s demand that corporate management is duty bound to make the 
corporation in which they serve profitable.  Even in very early American case law, it was 
clear to the court in a Florida case called Louis K. Liggett Co. et al. v. Lee, Comptroller et 
al., 288 US 517 (1933) (“Ligget Co.”), that corporations were a person in some unusual 
manner. 
The Ligget Co. case involved the payment of a graduated license fee for stores 
that were located in more than one county within the state of Florida.  In its reasons, the 
court observed that a massive amount of “industrial wealth has passed from individual 
possession to the ownership of large corporations” (Ligget Co. 566).  The growth of 
corporations has resulted in a “marked concentration of individual wealth” resulting in a 
“Frankenstein monster which states have created by their corporation laws” (Ligget Co. 
567).  Seeing the corporation as the monster with no name in Frankenstein aptly 
characterizes corporations as human creations that take on a life of their own through 
the legal duty to make a profit. 
Rather than comparing corporations to psychopaths or Frankenstein, Deleuze 
sees corporations as a “spirit, a gas” which form part of our society of control (4).  
Societies of control are preceded by “disciplinary societies” characterized by an 
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“organization of vast spaces of enclosures” that include family, school, the factory, 
perhaps the barracks and even hospitals or, quite literally, prisons (Deleuze 3).  In 
disciplinary societies, people pass from each of these closed environments to the next, 
each having their own laws (Deleuze 3).  Each enclosure is a mold, according to 
Deleuze, where a person starts over again.  From their family (one mold), a person 
moves to school (another mold) where they must adopt a new set of norms or laws.  
Disciplinary societies, then, are marked by “short-term and rapid rates of turnover but 
also continuous and without limit” (Deleuze 5 and 6). 
Societies of control have, according to Deleuze, have taken over disciplinary 
societies and modulate rather than turnover (4).  This “modulation is like a self-deforming 
cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other” and is never finished 
(Deleuze 4 and 6).  For example, continual training has replaced school and, more to the 
point, corporations have replaced the factory (Deleuze 5).  Corporations fit nicely within 
Deleuze’s conception of society as modulating.  One aspect of the corporation is that it 
never dies (unless someone takes positive action to have the corporation unwound or 
the corporation does not undergo its annual filings).  Corporations continue to exist 
despite the change in management and shareholders and, as a result, can thrive in a 
society that modulates.  And the corporation “constantly presents the brashest form of 
emulation, an excellent motivational force that opposes individuals against one another” 
(Deleuze 5).  Deleuze is right: corporations, by virtue of the law that permits their 
existence, are set up to pursue profit.  This pursuit has produced terrible opposition 
between and among people. 
A poignant example of how the corporation excels as this “motivational force” is 
found in the R. v. Canadian Tire Corporation Limited, 2004 CanLII 4462 (ON SC) 
(“Canadian Tire”) case.  This case centered on the importation of fridges from China that 
contained freon for the Canadian market.  The importation of freon has been illegal in 
Canada since January 1st, 1999 after a regulation was passed under section 113(f) of 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (“CEPA”) (Canadian Tire 
1).  Canadian Tire continued to stock the fridges throughout 1999.  Moreover, Canadian 
Tire continued to import the fridges containing freon.  An investigation by the 
investigatory body under CEPA revealed that Canadian Tire had fridges in stock that 
were manufactured in October of 1999 with over 4000 units being imported in that year 
(Canadian Tire 6). 
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On the stand at trial, Gail Bebee – who was the Director of Environment, Health 
and Safety for Canadian Tire – testified that it was her department’s job to track 
Canadian regulations, advise the buy and make sure that the products Canadian Tire 
purchased complied (Canadian Tire 15).  To fulfill this responsibility, Ms. Bebee testified 
that she contacted the buying team in Hong Kong to determine whether any of the 
products violated the regulation under CEPA to which she said took the word of the 
vendor that the products met Canadian regulations (Canadian Tire 16-17).  Despite 
operating 451 stores across Canada with an operating budget just under six billion dollar 
(Canadian Tire 27) and despite the evidence that freon is a dangerous chemical that is 
harmful to the earth’s atmosphere (Canadian Tire 28-29), Canadian Tire relied on the 
representation of others to ensure that it satisfied the regulations under CEPA.  Of the 
3090 fridges that Canadian Tire imported, there were enough harmful chemicals to 
“create a hole in ozone layer of 200 square meters that would last 100 years” (Canadian 
Tire 29). 
Both the trial judge and the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that Canadian 
Tire did not fulfill its legal duty to avoid importing the fridges containing the illegal 
chemicals by simply relying on its foreign supplier.  Anytime there is a “dilution of public 
protection by laying off responsibility to a third party for regulation compliance is 
frequently viewed with a healthy dose of suspicion” (Canadian Tire 41-42).  More 
importantly, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that there “was a flavour about the 
corporation’s submissions at trial, and to a much lesser extent on appeal, that the 
proscribed CFC was not that dangerous and that the foreseeable harm from a breach of 
the law somewhat speculative” and that compliance with the regulations under CEPA 
“was not a priority within the risk assessment program” of Canadian Tire (Canadian Tire 
45-46).  The evidence was overwhelmingly stacked against Canadian Tire in this case.  
In another case illustrating corporate motivation for profit is Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. 
Araya, 2020 SCC 5 (“Nevsun”).  While the SCC in this case could not substantiate the 
allegations made, the case highlights what lengths corporations may go to in pursuit of 
profit. 
The Nevsun case involved an appeal to human rights law by three refugees and 
Eritrean nationals: Gize Yebeyo Araya, Kesete Fshazion and Mihretab Yemane Tekle 
and Nevsun Resources Ltd. (Nevsun 36).  Nevsun Resources Ltd., a Canadian 
company, owned the Bisha mine in Eritrea.  On behalf of 1000 mine workers in Eritrea, 
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Araya, Fshazion and Tekle sued Nevsun Resources Ltd. for damages because, they 
allege, that they were involved in Eritrea’s National Service Program, which “conscripted 
through their military service” and placed them “into a forced labor regime whether they 
were required to work at the Bisha mine…and subjected to violent, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment” (Nevsun 36).  As part of their mandatory military training, the 
Eritrean government required that all Eritreans, upon reaching the age of 18, had to 
complete 12 months of “military development service” which may include assistance with 
public projects, including at the Bisha mine (Nevsun 38). 
In response to these claims, Nevsun argued that Canadian courts had no 
jurisdiction to hear such disputes to assess the “sovereign acts of a foreign government” 
including Eritrea (Nevsun 37).  Unfortunately for the three Eritreans, the SCC agreed.  
Because the Eritrean respondents relied on international human rights law, the SCC said 
that to “obtain relief, the respondents [from Eritrea] would have to establish that the 
National Service Program is a system of forced labour that constitutes a crime against 
humanity” (Nevsun 179).  Whether or not the allegations are true, it demonstrates how a 
corporation is “an excellent motivational force that that opposes individuals against one 
another.”  Deleuze said that “we are taught that corporations have souls” (6).  Indeed, 
corporations assist in this education.  And this is “the most terrifying thing in the world” 
(Deleuze 6). 
Hebert Marcuse might agree with Deleuze’s idea that we live in a society of 
control.  Marcuse said that “contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian” 
which is not limited to a “terroristic political coordination of society, but also a non-
terroristic economic-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of 
needs vested by interests” (Marcuse 3).  At the heart, or very close to it, of this 
manipulation is the corporation.  As discussed above, corporations do this through add 
campaigns and through their own self-promotion as human or human-like.  The 
successful creation of this manipulation has, in part, led to a perversion of Charter rights 
and freedoms. 
Marcuse points out that rights and liberties were crucial elements in the “origins 
and earlier stages of industrial society” (1).  But these rights and freedoms have lost, at 
least in part, “their traditional and rational content” (Marcuse 1).  This is no more evident 
in the granting of rights to corporations because they somehow have an interest in 
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certain rights and freedoms.  This illuminates what Marcuse calls the “most vexing 
aspects of advanced industrial society: the rational character of its irrationality” (9).  The 
SCC has successfully developed its own internal logic for granting Charter rights to 
corporations with little awareness of its irrationality. 
Granting corporations rights under the Charter, then, simply arms corporations 
with another tool to maximize its wealth.  Statutory law, as seen above, aims to limit 
certain conduct (whether it’s the conduct of natural or corporate persons) by, for 
example, limiting one’s ability to advertise to children or set boundaries around 
acceptable advertising practices for the sale of tobacco .  These statutory limitations 
attempt to restrict the conduct of corporations, conduct that may affect particularly 
vulnerable members of society.  However, having access to the Charter allows 
corporations, when successfully arguing under the Charter, to continue to pursue wealth 
with fewer statutory impediments. 
In an attempt to dislodge judges, lawyers, and law-makers from their commonly 
held view that corporations are persons and thus entitled to Charter rights, I shall 
investigate the manner in which the SCC (and others in the legal community) employs 
language in the Charter-based case law in chapter four.  In so doing, I hope to expose is 
the hidden judicial assumption that corporations are something with an existence 
independent of language and the positive law.  As a result, the SCC seems compelled to 
articulate a complete and accurate representation of corporations, their interests, and 
how those interests accord with rights and freedoms. 
Unveiling the hidden assumptions made by the SCC and then altering the way in 
which judges understand and characterize corporations will reveal that corporations are 
persons but only for very limited purposes.  The general rule in Canadian law seems to 
be that corporations are persons and therefore fall within the scope of those that bear 
rights.  I will offer a different explanation.  Through a change in our discourse around 
corporations, the general rule ought to be that corporations are not among the bearers of 
rights under the Charter unless it would serve the broader interest of society to do so.  
To support this conclusion, I shall discuss Wittgenstein’s early views on philosophy of 
language as a heuristic device to analyze the hidden assumptions that the SCC makes 
about language and its application to corporations.  For a different explanation on what 
corporations are, I will then discuss Wittgenstein’s later views on the philosophy of 
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language.  Considering corporations in light of Wittgenstein’s later approach to language 
will, I hope, provide a less constrained way to talk about corporations, a way that will 
provide greater clarity.  Ultimately, it could provide a means to impose more effective 
constraints on corporations. 
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Chapter 5.  
 
Legal Discourse and Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Language 
5.1. Introduction 
With the exception of cases that simply grant corporations standing to challenge 
the constitutionality of legislation, the SCC has made an ontological mistake in Charter 
cases where the SCC says that corporations have interests.  Through the purposive 
approach, the SCC has granted the same ontological status, in some cases, to 
corporate persons as natural persons.  That natural persons and corporate persons can 
be treated the same for certain purposes is valid (I will discuss this further below).  
However, this comparison has limited currency.  The ontological mistake that the courts 
make when they use the purposive approach is based on the idea corporations, like 
natural persons, have interests.  But corporate persons and natural persons are 
ontologically different: without positive law, corporations do not exist.  Natural persons 
do.  And something that is the creation of a statute cannot have interests.  Even if 
corporations can be said to have interests, those interests are limited to the single 
interest of profit. 
To correct this mistake, judges can employ language in such a way that releases 
them from the reductionist confines brought about by how they discuss corporations.  
Currently, judges seem to be wrapped up in discovering the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of corporate personhood.  The starting point for this discussion appears to be 
that corporations are persons just like natural persons.  With that general rule in place, 
judges have made exceptions by describing how they are, at times, different.  This 
seems to lead to an epistemic commitment by the courts to describe the outside world 
correctly, corporations included. 
To illustrate how judges seem to use language to seek out the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of corporate personhood, I will use Wittgenstein’s early ideas on the 
philosophy of language in the Tractatus as a heuristic device to show how the SCC 
characterizes corporations as facts, which have “state[s] of affairs…written into” them 
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(Wittgenstein Tractatus 7).  This characterization of language is analogous to the use of 
language used by the SCC, is a problematic view of language.  In its place, I will argue 
that Wittgenstein’s later ideas on philosophy of language, specifically in Philosophical 
Investigations, provide a framework for thinking about “corporations as persons” as just 
another language game to be placed alongside, with some overlap, other language 
games.  With the adoption of a different way of perceiving language and the role of 
corporations, the SCC would be unshackled from the limits of language proposed by 
early Wittgenstein.  This unshackling would allow the courts to see corporations as part 
of a language game different from natural persons.  This would replace their current 
commitment to assuming that a corporation has a state of affairs and that their job is to 
articulate them accurately.  It would enable us to notice the difference between legal 
persons while also enabling us to identify important family resemblances between them.  
Wittgenstein’s early philosophy of language is a theory “perhaps best regarded as a 
theory of representation” where any representation provides a “true or false picture of 
what it represents” (Kenny 44).  To represent something, one must get it right.  This, in 
short, is how the SCC has treated corporations.  As a fact that imposes the demand 
upon the courts to get its description right. 
5.2. The Bareness of Language: Language as 
Representation 
Before demonstrating a connection between the SCC’s characterizations of 
corporations and Wittgenstein’s early philosophy of language, I shall provide an 
overview of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language from the Tractatus.  I will then use this 
as a framework to understand how the SCC uses language in a manner consistent with 
Wittgenstein and how this approach to language imposes limits on language users.  This 
limitation, a limitation seemingly consistent with the SCC’s decisions on corporate rights 
under the Charter, results in a constricted vision of corporations that unjustifiably 
includes them among those who bear rights under the Charter. 
Language for early Wittgenstein relied on the idea that what can be said, can be 
said clearly and what cannot be said is nonsense (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 4).  This led 
him to declare that “what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk 
about we must pass over in silence” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 3).  The expression of 
thoughts had a limit and what cannot be talked about is nonsensical (Wittgenstein, 
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Tractatus 3).  Expressing oneself clearly requires an understanding of objects.  To “know 
an object” one also “know[s] all its possible occurrences in states of affairs” 
(Wittgenstein, Tractatus 6).  For Wittgenstein, all of the possibilities are part of the nature 
of that object (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 6). 
Knowledge of these possibilities lays in the thing itself, its “internal properties” 
and not its “external properties” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 6).  Where one expresses truth 
about an object, one understands these internal properties because each proposition is 
logically independent of others (Ayer 17).  To provide a complete account of reality, then, 
“one has to say which of [the logical pictorals or propositions] are true and which of them 
are false” (Ayer 17). 
This provides a clearer idea of what constitutes nonsense for Wittgenstein.  A 
sign is simply the expression of a thought (Wittgenstein Tractatus, 13).  Nonsense arises 
when a sign fails to accurately express a proposition (Ayer 18). 
Truth about a thing is not expressed in a contextual or relational manner 
demonstrated through an understanding of its external properties.  Rather, the truth 
about a thing is found within the thing itself.  This idea introduces the role that logic plays 
in language for Wittgenstein.  “In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a 
state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself” 
(Wittgenstein, Tractatus 6).  For early Wittgenstein, where all objects are given then all 
states of affairs are given (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 7).  And those states of affairs are 
“written into the thing itself” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 6).  This encoding of truth in the 
thing itself purges contingency from truth and language. 
For Wittgenstein, logic deals with every possibility and “all possibilities are its 
facts” (Tractatus 6).  So when an object is given, all of its possible states of affairs are 
given.  Objects, for early Wittgenstein, are unalterable and are distinguishable from one 
another (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 8).  And since there are unalterable objects in the world, 
the world itself possesses an unalterable form (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 8).  Therefore, 
the role of language is to decode or represent these objects accurately.  Language 
represents these facts by reaching “out to reality” and are “laid against reality like a 
measure” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 10). 
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To utter a factual proposition, we must express a thought through a propositional 
sign.  “In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the 
propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 14).  
These pictures, articulated through propositional signs, either represent reality with 
accuracy or inaccuracy.  “Reality is compared with propositions” and “the proposition can 
be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 27).  
Where it is accurate, there is truth; where the picture is inaccurate, there is falsehood 
(Wittgenstein, Tractatus 12). 
For Augustine, learning a language is similar to Wittgenstein’s concept of 
language as representationalist in the Tractatus.  As a boy, Augustine learned language 
by noticing “that people would name some object and then turn towards whatever it was 
that they had named” (Augustine 29).  After a while, Augustine was able to see that the 
sound made correlated to the thing being talked about with assistance from the 
“universal language” of “expressions of the face and yeses, gestures and tones of voice” 
(29).  Over time, the language learner can detect a pattern in speech and then mimic 
that pattern by mastering pronunciation and learning how to express oneself (Augustine 
29). 
This way of learning a language is what Wittgenstein calls the “ostensive 
teaching of words” because the learner gains an understanding of language through the 
utterance of the word followed by a demonstration of what the word correlates to in the 
real world (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 7).  The ostensive teaching of 
words is a simplified version of Wittgenstein’s representationalist model of language 
where language reaches out to the world.  For both Augustine and Wittgenstein, though, 
language is the key to help us understand the outside world. 
Wittgenstein seems to suggest, as Richard Rorty articulated, that language is a 
medium.  Language “stands between the self and the nonhuman reality with which the 
self seeks to be in touch” (Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity 10).  Language, then, 
is to be judged as accurate if it gets reality and the self together and inaccurate or false if 
it keeps them apart (Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity 11).   
Logic plays a key role in early Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language although it’s 
unclear how.  He says that it’s “impossible to represent anything in language that 
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‘contradicts logic’” such as “to give the co-ordinates of a point that do not exist” 
(Wittgenstein, Tractatus 13).  However, the concept of logic cannot be represented in 
facts (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 15).  Wittgenstein said that “there can be no 
representatives of the logic of fact” (Tractatus 26).  Rather, he relies on the self-evident 
nature of logic.  “Self-evidence…can become indispensable in logic, only because 
language itself prevents every logical mistake.-What makes logic a priori is the 
impossibility of illogical thought” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 57).  Logic, then, manifests 
itself through propositions.  “What finds its reflection in language, language cannot 
represent.  What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of 
language.  Propositions show the logical form of reality.  They display it”  (Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus 31).  Logic in language, then, materializes from the proper use of language 
when it expresses truth. 
The accuracy or truth of any representation requires a minimum commonality 
between the picture and what is being represented (Kenny 47).  This is what 
Wittgenstein calls the “logical form” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 11).  He states that “any 
picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict 
it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality” 
(Wittgenstein, Tractatus 10).  If logic is taken away then logical pictures are impossible 
(Kenny 48).  However, logic is ineffable; it can be shown but not said (Rorty, Essays on 
Heidegger and Others 55).  Wittgenstein said that “propositions cannot represent logical 
form: it is mirrored in them” (Tractatus 31). 
The ineffable and self-evident characteristic of logic, for Rorty, plays the same 
role in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy of language as a “transcendent Diety” did for 
theologians (Rorty, Essays on Heiddegger and Others 55).  God, or in the case of early 
Wittgenstein, logic, is an unexplained explainer, a thing which “cannot, on pain of infinite 
regress, be contextualized or explained” (Rorty, Essays on Heiddegger and Others 54).  
Rorty called these “Type A entities” and these types of entities are hopeless at providing 
clarity to the problem.  Rorty goes on to ask, “if God can be causa sui, why should not 
the world be?  Why not just identify God and nature”? (Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and 
Others 55).  This is precisely the claim that Wittgenstein is trying to make in the 
Tractatus: removing God and replacing it with logic as the unexplained explainer, allows 
him to save his philosophical idea that there are formal limits to language.  Language is 
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bounded by the world-out-there and the role of language is to get it right.  Anything short 
of that is nonsense. 
The SCC appears to utilize language in this manner.  Through the purposive 
approach and theorizing about corporations, judges have identified corporations as 
persons for the purposes of the Charter and then attempt to determine what interests 
they have.  Once it has created propositions that attempt to generate a true “picture of 
reality” of corporations then the SCC is adequately equipped to accurately assign 
corporations with the appropriate Charter rights and/or freedoms.  Admittedly, the courts 
are concerned with the effects a judgement can have on society (for example, in the CIP 
case, the SCC was concerned about the integrity of the judiciary and, in the Little Sisters 
case, the SCC considered the effects of legislation on minority groups); however, the 
starting point is that corporations are persons and, as such, deserve protections under 
the Charter. 
The role of the courts, then, appears to be like that of philosophy according to 
Wittgenstein: it “aims at the logical clarification of thoughts” and like law, philosophy aims 
at thoughts that are not “cloudy and indistinct” by making those thoughts “clear” and with 
“sharp boundaries” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 29-30).  The attempt at outlining these sharp 
boundaries, however, has resulted in a lack of clarity.  When the concept of personhood 
results in an absurdity (such as in section 7 cases above), the SCC creates exceptions. 
Like Wittgenstein, the SCC has treated corporations as propositions with an 
unalterable form.  They attempted to employ language to achieve clear thoughts with 
sharp boundaries to reveal the truth about corporations.  This is particularly true in cases 
where the SCC uses the purposive approach to determine, through a representationalist 
mode of language, whether corporations have an interest that accords with the purpose 
of a right or freedom under the Charter. 
We see glimmers of the purposive approach in the context of the expression 
cases in Devine, Ford, and Irwin Toy.  In these cases, the SCC justified the granting of 
freedom of expression to corporations by relying on the foundational reasons behind free 
expression.  Sharing reasons, the Devine and Ford cases that claim that freedom of 
expression has an “intrinsic value” and that, at least in part, commercial expression 
helps to “protect listeners as well as speakers” (Ford 767).  It’s not clear whether the 
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SCC justifies commercial expression on the principled “intrinsic value” or expression or 
because granting this right also protects listeners; however the court did say that 
freedom of expression protects “speakers” (Ford 767). 
The SCC moved closer to an unconscious commitment to a Wittgensteinian 
representationalist mode of language in the Irwin Toy case.  Expression, the SCC said, 
belongs to corporation “because in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a 
diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and to the 
individual” (Irwin Toy 968).  Without explicitly appealing to the purposive approach, the 
SCC appears to imply that corporations are beneficiaries of the inherent values that 
freedom of expression offers.  It appears as though the SCC knows the possible 
occurrences in the “states of affairs” of corporations, possibilities that are part of the 
nature of what it means to be a corporation (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 6). 
Over time, the SCC softened the degree of protection afforded to corporations 
under section 2(b) of the Charter.  In the Rocket and RJR cases, the SCC said that 
expression for economic purposes receives less protection than other types of 
expression.  Both of these cases involved advertising and judges wanted to strike a 
balance between one’s right to free expression while protecting the public from 
manipulative marketing.  Despite the softening of the protection, the SCC still valued a 
corporation’s right to free expression as though having an interest in free expression 
constituted one of the internal properties of a corporation. 
The SCC returned to a robust protection of corporate expression in the Thomson 
1998 case, which centered on the publication of polling information under the Canada 
Elections Act.  Thomson Newspapers Company Limited and Southam Inc. initiated the 
Charter challenge and, striking down the provisions of the Canada Elections Act that 
violated the Charter, the SCC chose not to do an explicit purposive analysis.  But by 
situating polling information with political expression, the SCC implied corporations, like 
Thomson Newspapers Company Limited and Southam Inc., have an interest in freedom 
of expression further implying that corporation are things with internal properties which 
language must reach out to. 
The pursuit of clarity in language, to create “sharp boundaries,” that captures the 
internal properties of corporations continued in the history of section 7 – the right to life, 
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liberty, and security of the person – of the Charter.  In these cases, however, the SCC 
decided not to grant this right.  Yet, in not granting the right under section 7, the SCC 
once again articulated what the “internal properties” of corporations are in cases like 
Irwin Toy, Thomson 1990 and Wholesale.  In this line of cases, the SCC adopted a 
corporate theory approach on its way to refusing corporations this right.  Section 7 of the 
Charter is now widely understood to be reserved for natural persons as these rights 
serve “to underline the human element” (Irwin Toy 1004).  To say otherwise would be 
false as the internal properties of a corporation do not allow for such a description. 
While the Thomson 1990 and Wholesale cases upheld the decision in Irwin Toy, 
the SCC carved out specific exceptions in each: there were natural people involved in 
the Thomson 1990 case and Wholesale was successful in availing itself of protections of 
section 7 by arguing that it had standing to bring such a claim.  However, the widely 
accepted idea is that corporations, despite being legal persons, are not human and 
therefore do not attract the direct protection of section 7 of the Charter.  While the SCC 
is right that corporations are not sufficiently person-like, the reasoning seems logically 
connected with the cases above relating to freedom of expression; their internal 
properties, while person-like, are insufficiently person-like to attract such a right. 
Unlike section 7 of the Charter, the SCC found that section 8 – the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure – is a right that appropriately belongs 
to corporations by once again utilizing the purposive approach.  The early cases, such 
as Southam and Thomson 1990, began to explore the purposive approach for the 
purposes of articulating Charter rights.  In Southam, the SCC fleshed out the purpose of 
section 8 as a way to protect a person’s right to privacy where there was a reasonable 
expectation to such privacy.  The court in Thomson 1990 expanded the scope of the 
protection to not just the inviolability of one’s body but to include the protection of privacy 
in relation to a person’s belongings such as books, records and other documents 
(Thomson 1990 492).  In neither of these cases did the SCC claim that corporations 
have an interest that accords with the protections afforded by section 8 of the Charter; 
however, it was the McKinlay case where the SCC made a robust commitment to the 
idea that corporations have interests. 
While the corporate appellant was not successful in McKinlay, the SCC stressed 
that the purposive approach resulted in protections under section 8 for corporations.  
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The SCC said that the expectation of privacy was lower for businesses than it is in a 
person’s home.  This protection was more deeply entrenched in the Lessard case where 
the SCC said that the search of premises, owned by a natural person or owned by a 
corporation, constitutes a “significant intrusion” (444). 
The granting by the SCC of the right to be secure against unreasonable search 
and seizure to corporations seems to continue to treat corporations as the sorts of facts 
that Wittgenstein discusses in the Tractatus.  The Justices of the SCC appeared to make 
truth claims about corporations.  They seem to see corporations as objects that form part 
of reality and the job of language is to represent this reality with accuracy.  The way in 
which the SCC does this is by articulating what interests a corporation possesses in a 
way that suggests these interests are part of what Ayer refers to as the internal 
properties of that object (17).  Consistent with Wittgenstein, then, the SCC appears to 
articulate these internal properties so that the appropriate Charter rights can be ascribed 
because the very nature of the corporate object demands it.  To get this wrong, to create 
false propositions about corporations, could result in nonsensical case law.  The problem 
is that the representation then appears to constrain judicial decision-making. 
This constraint is evident in cases like CIP where the SCC articulated yet another 
corporate “interest.”  While CIP was unsuccessful in its attempt to seek protection under 
the Charter, the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time, the fact that the SCC 
said that corporations have a legitimate interest in this right compels future courts to 
treat corporations as persons for this purpose.  Due to a number of adjournments at trial, 
CIP Inc. wanted to avail itself of section 11(b) of the Charter claiming that its right to be 
tried in a reasonable time had been violated.  The SCC said that the purpose of section 
11(b) is to prevent trials extending over prolonged periods of time due to the potential for 
loss of witnesses and that testimony becomes less reliable.  The SCC clearly stated that 
CIP Inc. has a “legitimate interest” in such a right (CIP 856).  And like the Southam, 
Thomson 1990, McKinley and Lessard cases addressed corporate interests in relation to 
section 8 of the Charter, the SCC in CIP similarly envisioned corporations as objects 
with a reality independent of language and that language must be employed in such a 
way as to accurately depict the nature of these entities.  The constraint arises based on 
the idea that a corporation has an interest and that a discussion of this right must 
account for this interest. 
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Through the use of the purposive approach in the Amway case – despite the 
case not resulting in the attachment of the right not to be compelled as a witness – the 
SCC committed same ontological mistake made in previous cases.  The SCC 
determined that the purpose of section 11(c) of the Charter, the right not to be compelled 
to be a witness, is to protect the privacy and dignity of an accused.  According to the 
SCC, granting this right to corporations is irrational because they are incapable of taking 
the stand.  So, corporations cannot be said to have an interest that accords with the 
purpose of section 11(c) based on its dissimilarity to a natural person (bearing in mind, 
once again, that an officer of a corporation is distinct from it).  The presumption is that 
corporations have interests, interests that appear to be consistent with Wittgenstein’s 
idea that facts – such as corporations – have states of affairs.  To avoid an absurdity, the 
SCC has tried to articulate statements about corporations that mirror their states of 
affairs. 
The SCC’s adoption of the purposive and corporate theory approaches to 
determining corporate rights and freedoms under the Charter has led to corporations 
being hypostatized in much the same way as the standing argument has.  In the Big M 
Drug Mart case, the SCC found it irrelevant whether “real persons or artificial ones such 
as corporations” have had their rights infringed because it is not a matter of being able to 
enjoy the right or freedom (Big M Drug Mart 313, Tollefson 323-324).  This idea was 
adopted and further expanded upon in the Wholesale case. 
In Wholesale, the SCC granted standing to Wholesale, a corporation, to 
challenge whether section 37.3(2) of the federal Competition Act, which provided a 
reverse onus, violated one’s right to be presumed innocent.  To justify overturning this 
provision for violating the Charter, the SCC said that no person should be convicted of 
an offence that stems from an unconstitutional law.  This reasoning, however, begs the 
question.  This statement adopts a sort of Wittgensteinian approach to language under 
the Tractatus by presuming that a corporation bears the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of personhood.  And while the SCC said that legislators can draft the 
legislation so that it only applies to corporations thus precluding a corporate litigant from 
achieving standing to make such an argument, it mistakenly treats corporations as 
objects possessing their own internal states of affairs.  Corporations, then, continue to 
constrain what judges feel they can and cannot do in relation to the Charter. 
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The accuracy or truth of any representation requires a minimum commonality 
between the picture and what is being pictured, representation and thing represented, 
sign and referent.  This is the way in which the SCC seems to deploy language when 
thinking about corporations.  The result constrains judicial action.  The ontological 
assumption made by the SCC is that corporations constitute a fact which requires 
language users (i.e. themselves) to arrange language in a manner that chimes with that 
fact.  Language, then, can and should be refined in such a way as to mirror the “states of 
affairs” of all facts and, indeed, corporations.  The SCC implicitly agrees that language is 
only useful if it accurately measures up to reality.  This will help to avoid nonsense while 
pursuing “sharp boundaries” in language. 
This approach to the use of language has led the SCC to apply, and sometimes 
refuse to apply, Charter rights and freedoms to corporations.  And while the results may 
or may not be desirable, the method for arriving at these conclusions is improper.  These 
cases treat corporations as something that all language users, and in particular judges, 
owe a duty of loyalty.  This duty requires language users to understand and properly 
articulate their states of affairs.  In addition to large multi-national corporations amassing 
massive amounts of wealth and political influence, corporations are also entitled to 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
The more accurate way to view corporations is as a tool.  They are a tool to 
inspire investment from people, typically shareholders, which give corporations access 
to greater wealth to increase productivity and profitability, while limiting the liability of 
those investors to no more than their investment.  Unlike sole proprietorships and 
partnerships that expose the business owners to unlimited personal liability, corporations 
have been an effective tool in promoting investments. 
The Solomon case provided a way to think about corporations when it called 
them a “distinct legal persona.”  The distinctness is between, but not limited to, 
shareholders and the corporation itself.  But there is a way out that might allow the 
courts to return to a different way of perceiving corporations and that way might lie in 
Wittgenstein’s approach to language in the Philosophical Investigations.  The 
Philosophical Investigations may provide an illustration of how an old way of speaking is 
a ladder that needs to be thrown away in favour of something new (Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus 89). 
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5.3. A Multiplicity of Relations: Language as Games 
Wittgenstein came to see his earlier thoughts on language as misguided.  In the 
Philosophical Investigations, he saw languages as games, not as final expressions of 
reality.  The Philosophical Investigations is, partly, a repudiation of the Tractatus (Ayer 
67).  Younger Wittgenstein wanted sentences to be pictures; later Wittgenstein wanted 
them to be tools (Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others 52).  More specifically, he 
analogized the rules of a language game to that of a normal game.  He says that a word, 
like the game of chess, is “not everywhere bounded by rules.  But what does a game 
look like that is everywhere bounded by rules?” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 44). 
A rule, according to Wittgenstein, is more like a signpost.  Under his 
representationalist theory in the Tractatus, a proposition was either true or false.  Like 
Augustine learning language by seeing patterns emerge based on the successful 
correspondence of to something in the world to the words uttered, Wittgenstein’s theory 
of language required correspondence.  But Wittgenstein came to see this as an 
oversimplified view of language.  While one may learn nouns in such a way, like “chair” 
or “bread”, it fails to see how context plays a role in language. 
By way of example, Wittgenstein used the sentence of a shopping list containing 
the phrase “five red apples” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 5).  The words 
“red” and “apple”, while likely known by heart, are easy enough to reference.  A chart 
may provide an example of what “red” and “apples” are.  Yet there is no such way to 
ascertain the meaning of “five” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 6).  So 
Augustine “does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call 
language is this system” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 6).  Ostensible 
teaching of language can lead to a foggy conception of meaning but the fog lifts when 
“one can clearly survey the purpose and functioning of the words” (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations 7).  Seeing language in this context is akin to seeing 
language as a series of games. 
In this picture of language as a game, the use of words is contingent upon its 
context.  “The meaning of words is derived by its use” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 59).  This use gives rise to a contextual use of language.  Words and 
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sentences do not form a bounded whole that accurately reflect the world but rather are 
“a set of indefinitely expandable practices” where the truth of one sentence is contingent 
upon the truth of another (Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others 57).  Another way of 
seeing language is that it’s a toolbox consisting of different tools.  “Think of tools in a 
toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails 
and screws. – The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects” 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 9).  The concept of words as tools is useful to 
help eliminate misunderstandings and give meaning in the context in which the word is 
being used. 
In the context of a language game, language-users strive to “eliminate 
misunderstandings by making expressions more exact” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 46).  Where an expression is inexact, it is not unusable but subject to 
criticism and where it is exact, subject to praise (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 46). 
Wittgenstein used the example of various kinds of handles found in the cabin of a 
locomotive to illustrate this point.  He said that all the handles in a locomotive look 
similar; this stands to reason as they are all meant to be handled (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations 10).  But each handle performs different tasks.  One handle 
allows the engineer to turn a crank to regulate the opening of a valve; another handle is 
a switch; while yet another handle, when operated, allows the engineer to apply the 
brakes (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 10).  To say, then, that a word 
signifies something, like Augustine, doesn’t mean that we have meant anything.  For 
meaning to emerge, we provide some context in which that word in being used 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 10).  The context illuminates the distinction. 
Unlike tools, the language user, in particular when language is being used in a 
new way, is “typically unable to make clear exactly what it is that he wants to do before 
developing the language” whereas the craftsperson knows which tool to utilize for each 
job (Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity 12-13).  Language can then be utilized to 
discuss “utopian politics or revolutionary science (as opposed to parliamentary politics, 
or normal science).  The method is to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until 
you have created a pattern of linguistic behaviour which will tempt the rising generation 
to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic 
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behavior, for example, the adoption of…new social institutions” (Rorty, Contingency, 
irony and solidarity 9).  Language as a game consisting of different tools illuminates how 
language can be used in ways to express new ideas or old ideas in a new way.  
Language as a game also allows us to recognize that the current use of our language is 
not producing the kinds of results we want.  With this critical eye, language users can 
then forge a new language game, effectively creating a new tool, to do the work we want 
it to. 
Like later Wittgenstein, Roland Barthes understood that language did not reach 
out to reality to create eternal truths or eternal truth-values.  For Barthes, the idea of 
myth is similar to Wittgenstein’s language-as-game idea.  Myth, for Barthes, is a type of 
speech predicated upon a “system of communication” (Barthes 109).  The system of 
communication has a set of special circumstances that give rise to myth.  But with myth, 
there are no rules that limit what we may say.  “A tree is a tree.  Yes, of course.  But a 
tree expressed by Minou Drouet is no longer quite a tree, it is a tree which is decorated, 
adapted to a certain type of consumption, laden with literary self-indulgence” (Barthes 
109).  Myth balks at the eternal and strives for the contingent. 
Unlike mathematics, which is a finished language, myth “is a language which 
does not want to die: it wrests from the meanings which give it its sustenance as 
insidious, degraded survival, it provokes in them an artificial reprieve in which it settles 
comfortably, it turns them into speaking corpses” (Barthes 133).  The SCC has treated 
the idea of corporate personhood as a finished language or, at the very least, is trying to 
forge a finished language. 
Like myths, language games lack a finished quality to them.  They are varied and 
include “describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurement,” “reporting an 
event,” “speculating about the event,” and “forming and testing a hypothesis” 
(Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations 15).  This lack of a finished quality to language 
marks a change in Wittgenstein’s thinking from his commitment to “search for the 
general form of propositions…and with it the idea of there being something common to 
everything we call language” in the Tractatus, which he swapped out for “a multiplicity of 
relations” in the Philosophical Investigations (Ayer 69). 
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To understand the idea that language is a game or series of games, Wittgenstein 
analogizes to actual games asking “What is common to all of them?” (Philosophical 
Investigations 36).  He rejects the idea of a commonality of all games in favour of 
“similarities” or “affinities” among them (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 36).  
To make this point, he breaks off games into different types such as board games; card 
games, and ball games.  Games of the same type will have numerous affinities but 
between and among different types of games, a number of those affinities will drop out.  
Not all games, he says, are about winning and losing.  When “a child throws his ball at 
the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 36).  Wittgenstein avoids a reductionist account of games in favour a 
relational one.  He said that the “upshot of these condensations is: we see a complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the 
small” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 36). 
This network of similarities or affinities he describes as a “family resemblance” 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 36).  Family members possess a number of 
similar qualities such as build, temperament, eye colour, and so on, which overlap in the 
same way as games.  Games, then, form a family each with their shared and unique 
qualities (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 36). 
Wittgenstein addresses what a game is.  In this, he implicitly rejects the Platonic 
idea that examples are insufficient to build an understanding of what something is.  In 
Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates asks Theaetetus “what do you think knowledge is?” to 
which he responds that geometry and the art of the cobbler are examples of knowledge 
(Plato 9).  Socrates presses Theaetetus claiming that he has provided many examples 
but that what is required is one thing: “what, exactly, knowledge itself is” (Plato 10).  
Socrates was after the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge that avoided 
any reliance upon examples.  He wanted to get at something timeless and immutable.  
Rejecting this reductionist philosophy, Wittgenstein asked rhetorically “Isn’t my 
knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I can 
give?” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 40).  Our understanding of something, 
like the concept “game,” is built upon examples and analogies (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations 40).  There is no need to draw a “sharp boundary” or 
provide all the necessary and sufficient conditions.  Rather, if one were to try, the affinity 
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between different boundaries “is just as undeniable as the difference” (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations 40). 
This “sharp boundary” in language is no longer necessary according to 
Wittgenstein.  Language is “not everywhere bounded by rules” (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations 44).  Rules require fidelity.  The rule that corporations are 
persons attempts to express a precise idea and, when fidelity to the rule is not possible, 
the courts fashion exceptions to the general rule.  A sharp boundary requiring exactness 
is neither something we have “envisaged” nor do we know “what we are to make of this 
idea” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 44).  Just because something is inexact 
does not mean it is unusable.  What we need is context to make this determination.  It is 
inexact, for example, when one fails to provide the distance of the earth from the sun to 
the nearest metre; however, the goal is to generate an understanding of the vast 
distance between these two bodies and, here, inexactness is usable (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations 46). 
To reiterate, the goal of language is to purge itself of misunderstandings by 
speaking in a more exact fashion, not with “complete exactness” (Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations 48).  The goal is not to seek out the essence of language.  
“We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our 
investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language.  That 
is, the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, 
experience, and so forth” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 49).  If this is the 
correct view of language then the order must be “a super-order between – so to speak – 
super-concepts” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 49).  Language, for the later 
Wittgenstein, does not need such a lofty account.  In order for words such as “language”, 
“experience”, and “world” to have a use, there must “be as humble a one as that of the 
words “table”, “lamp”, and “door” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 49).  
Wittgenstein was not in pursuit of an ideal for language. 
The ideal is too lofty.  It demands accordance with logic of which there cannot be 
any vagueness (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 50).  The ideal is 
“unshakeable” but Wittgenstein demanded that we “must stick to everyday thought, and 
not get on the wrong track” where such a lofty ideal demands “extreme subtleties” which 
we are not able to describe (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 51).  Any attempt 
82 
to do so makes it seem “as if we had to repair a torn spider’s web with our fingers” 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 51). 
All this is a rejection of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which required a formal unity in 
language ((Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 51).  To avoid reliance on logic – 
the Type A entity or unexplained explainer – Wittgenstein drops the idea of logic as 
central to language altogether.  In its place he suggests that language itself is the 
appropriate tool to work through philosophical problems.  “Philosophy is a struggle 
against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language” 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 52).  The loftiness of language is replaced by 
the more humble task of using language as a tool to achieve more precision. 
To properly understand this new idea of language, Wittgenstein says we need an 
overview of words that allows us to see connections (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 54).  This interconnectedness of language, these ever new and expanding 
language games, is not a precursor to a future final language; rather, language games 
are ways in which we can establish new means of comparing things, to determine the 
similarities and dissimilarities (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 56).  The goal 
of the Tractatus was to develop correspondence between the world and what language 
users say (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 56).  The goal of the Philosophical 
Investigations is to do away with a representationalist model of language and to point out 
that language is a series of games with varying degrees of connectedness. 
To properly understand language as interconnected means to understand that 
meaning of words arises out of its use (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 59).  
So, true and false are the results of what we say because through language, we create 
agreement (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 94).  Seeing language as games 
allows the courts to characterize the word “person” for corporations as a separate 
language game from “person” used in the context of natural people. 
Wittgenstein’s later views on language in the Philosophical Investigations allow 
us to see two words, like “person,” that emerge from different language games as having 
similarities and dissimilarities.  The similarities between the corporate person language 
game and the natural person language game could be as follows: both can own 
property; both can enter into contractual relationships; both can enter into partnerships; 
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both are able to pursue wealth; and both are separate from any other person that they 
loan money to or borrow money from.  However, the differences are vast: corporations 
are legal fictions and have no physical existence; corporations have the sole purpose of 
pursuing profit; corporations enjoy a preferred tax rate in Canada; and corporations only 
come into “existence” through a process that requires legal recognition.  Natural persons 
share none of these traits. 
Despite the overwhelming support by the SCC that corporations are entitled to 
protections under that Charter, there have been glimpses in the court’s use of language 
where they see the phrase “corporate personhood” as nested in a different language 
game from the phrase “natural person.”  The SCC, at times, has effectively articulated 
differences between natural persons and corporate persons.  In Thomson 1990, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dube argued, in a manner consistent with Wittgenstein’s idea of language 
games, that corporations are indeed different types of persons than natural people.  In 
her dissent, Justice L’Heureux-Dube said that “[m]odern corporate existence carries with 
it a notion of privacy which is at odds with the privacy inhering in physical persons.  This 
difference flows from the nature of corporate existence” (Thomson 1990 589).  The 
recognition that corporations are fundamentally different from natural persons places 
each concept of “personhood” into two distinct language games. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dube continued that “individuals as a rule have full legal 
capacity by the operation of law alone” while “artificial persons are creatures of the state 
and enjoy civil rights and powers only upon the approval of statutory authorities” 
(Thomson 1990 589).  Even though Justice L’Heureux-Dube does not articulate what 
exactly the civil rights and powers that corporations enjoy, she said that “their legal 
power may be restricted” by, among other things, legislation.  These restrictions appear 
to be boundless as she also said that the state has the authority to terminate a 
corporation for its failure to comply with the law because it is the state that “defines the 
parameters of corporate existence” (Thomson 1990 589). 
This is precisely how Canadian courts ought to address the conception of a 
corporation: as one more tool within a language game where meaning, and therefore 
truth, is derived from the context in which it is used.  The corporation is a product of and 
subject to the state and, I would add, to judge-made law.  But the need to exercise 
control is a deeply important point.  Like Bakan, Justice L’Heureux-Dube recognized the 
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different impact corporations have on society because the “business decisions of 
corporations can affect the economy and thus indirectly influence the interests of many 
individuals in society at large” which has necessitated “a number of overriding societal 
objectives designed to control the public repercussions of corporate activities” (Thomson 
1990 590).  It is this background, together with the insights of Bakan, Deleuze, and 
others, that corporate rights must be viewed. 
The House of Lords in Salomon hinted at the idea that corporations might be 
demand a language game all its own when discussing their rights and liabilities.  
Couched in terms of limited shareholder liability, Lord Halsbury said that a company is 
an “artificial creation of the Legislature” and “once the company is legally incorporated, it 
must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities 
appropriate to itself” (Salomon 38) [emphasis mine].  This phrase, “appropriate to itself,” 
seems to suggest a proviso, a proviso which courts and law makers scarcely expand 
upon.  Rather, judges have, as a general rule, adopted the formulation that corporations 
are persons.  However, this proviso deserves some attention. 
To reiterate, the House of Lords in Salomon had to determine whether Salomon, 
the company, was distinct from Salomon the natural person who was both a shareholder 
and debenture holder.  It was from this perspective that the House of Lords analogized 
the company as a separate person.  In terms of debt obligations, the creditors did 
business with the corporation.  They did not have a contractual relationship with Aron 
Salomon.  The distinction between Salomon the natural person and his corporation, 
then, was a useful metaphor to help explain who bore the liability. 
It does not necessarily follow, then, that a company is its own person in all cases.  
To do so, would be an unjustifiable linguistic “metamorphosis” (like it would be to grant 
corporations the right to life, liberty, and security of the person) (Amway 40).  The most 
useful way to conceive of a corporation is that it’s a tool in a particular language game 
and serves to illustrate how one can invest in a company while enjoying the comfort of 
limited liability.  Language games, for Wittgenstein, are plentiful. 
The context of the language game imbues the words used with meaning.  
Language games include “reporting an event,” “Cracking a joke”, and “Acting in a play” 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 15).  To Wittgenstein’s list, I would add 
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“Speaking about the rights of natural persons” and “speaking about rights corporations” 
or “talking about natural persons” and “talking about corporate persons.”  It is important 
to know where one language ends and another begins” (Kenny 130).  Without context, 
without understanding language as a series of relations, we lose meaning.  In the 
context of the Charter, the SCC has largely failed to see where the language game 
about natural persons ends and where the language game about corporations begins. 
As explained above, there are times when the SCC has refused to grant 
corporations certain rights and freedoms under the Charter.  The conclusion that 
corporations are not entitled to certain Charter rights and freedoms is indeed the correct 
result.  As discussed in chapter 3, corporations are not entitled to avail themselves of the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person, and the right not to be compelled to be a 
witness.  The SCC declared that this right belongs to natural persons as corporations 
are not sufficiently person-like.  A legal fiction cannot be deprived of its life, liberty and 
security of the person. 
In discussing whether or not a corporation can be compelled to be a witness, the 
SCC rightfully pointed out that it would “strain the interpretation” of section 11(c) of the 
Charter (Amway 39).  Bearing no physical evidence of existence or the ability to speak 
on its own, a corporation would make a terrible witness.  With this observation, the SCC 
may be credited with seeing the difference between the language game of corporate 
personhood and of natural personhood.  It shows an understanding that corporations 
may bear economic similarities with natural persons but not a great deal more. 
However, the SCC collapses the dissimilarities between corporations and natural 
persons in their discussion of freedom of expression.  In this set of cases (despite 
extending weaker protection of freedom of expression to corporations), the SCC has 
been inconsistent in how it applies Charter rights to corporations.  Among the purposes 
behind the Charter right to freedom of expression is “truth for its own sake because it is 
an aspect of individual autonomy and self-realization” (Ford 765).  Like the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be compelled to be a witness, this 
purpose is wholly human.  The idea that a corporation has any sense of individual 
autonomy or that it can self-realize if only it was given the freedom to express itself is 
absurd.  Corporations, unlike natural persons, are set up to achieve only profit.  They 
neither have the desire for autonomy nor self-realization.  A corporation that makes a 
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profit is, according to the law and the will of the shareholders, fully “self-realized.”  The 
SCC’s failure to consistently and properly demarcate the language games between 
corporate and natural persons has not only led to a declaration that corporations are 
among the bearers of Charter rights; it has also led to a lack of clarity about what it 
means for a law to be unconstitutional. 
The SCC has said that “no one can be convicted of an offence under an 
unconstitutional law” (Wholesale 179).  In cases where corporations have been denied 
the benefit of a particular right (including freedom of religion and the right to life, liberty 
security of the person), corporations have still been successful in benefiting from Charter 
challenges where they have been granted standing.  The SCC did not include the 
freedom of religion among the rights enjoyed by corporations in the Big M Drug Mart 
case.  Big M Drug Mart benefited by being granted standing to challenge legislation that 
prevented businesses from being open on Sundays.  In its defense, the SCC analogized 
that preventing a corporation from bringing a claim under section 2(a) of the Charter is 
akin to an atheist being prevented from having standing.  This analogy fails on the basic 
premise that an atheist is, by virtue of being an atheist, expressing her lack of belief in 
God or an organized religion.  This just is a religious perspective.  Corporations are 
fictions; they have no religious opinions or perspectives.  Allowing them to have standing 
in a case grants corporations access to precisely what it is managers of that corporation 
are looking for: a legitimate legal means to have legislation that aims at limiting the 
power of corporations. 
Similarly, in Thomson 1990, the SCC decided that Thomson Newspapers could 
benefit from the Charter right to life, liberty and security of the person by making the 
offending legislation invalid.  In this case, though, the SCC said that the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person was appropriately invoked because there were also 
natural persons involved in making the appeal.  The result, however, is that while the 
natural people enjoy protections under this right, corporations equally enjoy the benefit 
of a successful Charter challenge.  Actually having an interest that accords with the 
purpose of the right is immaterial. 
The idea that an unconstitutional law should not be enforced against any person, 
natural or artificial, misses the point.  As discussed above, the appropriate context to 
consider corporate personhood is within its own language game, separate and apart 
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from natural persons.  While these persons have limited economic family resemblances, 
they are not part of the same language game when it comes to rights and freedoms 
under the Charter.  And since they are not part of the same language game, then any 
law that is deemed to violate any provision of the Charter is only unconstitutional for 
natural persons.  With a contextually driven approach to the word “person,” it is an error 
to say that an unconstitutional law for natural persons is, by logical extension, an 
unconstitutional law for corporations.  If corporations wish to serve a social function of 
protecting individual rights and freedoms under the Charter for the betterment of society 
at its own cost, then corporations ought to be granted standing in court to make such an 
argument.  This would be done, as a general rule, on the condition that corporations 
would not be able to enjoy the benefit of successful legal arguments.  As far as the 
Charter goes, only natural persons benefit from it.  So where the corporation makes 
successful arguments to invalidate unconstitutional legislation, that legislation ought to 
continue in full force and effect for corporations, not natural persons. 
Wresting control of the word “corporation” from a representation-like model of 
language and contextualizing it as yet another word in yet another language game 
provides not only law-makers but also courts with the ability to impose a vision of how 
we want corporate rights to look.  Rather than making statements about corporations 
that attempt to get at the “truth” of ‘corporate-ness’, the courts can focus on making 
statements about corporations that are more exact; whose very exactness depends 
upon an understanding of the context out of which corporations were born and what use 
they provide society. 
To reiterate, the context illuminates meaning.  A representationalist model of 
language, used unconsciously by the SCC, is not producing the sorts of results that we 
should accept.  Fundamental rights and freedoms are being granted to corporations.  
When these rights and freedoms are not granted to corporations, they are still receiving 
the benefit of those rights.  However, the differences between corporations and natural 
persons are more pronounced than the similarities.  By recognizing that corporations are 
created to be focused, above all else, on the pursuit of profit, and that they simply use 
the Charter to pursue this interest, then it is important to reconsider the current approach 
to rights for corporations under the Charter. 
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In chapter 6, I will provide a sketch of what such a reconsideration might look 
like.  Using the lessons from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, I will propose a 
test that Canadian courts could use when considering whether corporations ought to be 
among those that bear Charter rights and freedoms.  Such a test will recognize that 
corporate personhood occupies a different language game from natural persons and 
those rights and freedoms should only be extended to the former if it serves the interests 
of the latter. 
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Chapter 6.  
 
Reshaping Corporate Rights: The Public Interest 
Doctrine 
The notion that corporations constitute a person in law has taken on a nearly 
literal meaning that almost equates corporations to natural persons.  By employing a 
representationalist language, courts have seen corporations as more than vehicles to 
create profit, more than entities that inspire confidence in investors that extend to them 
the benefit of limited personal liability.  When the House of Lords granted separate legal 
personhood to companies in the Salomon case, it is an open question whether that court 
intended for personhood to extend beyond the economic separateness of corporations 
from its investors to one where corporations now enjoy protections under the Charter.  
To reiterate, it is, as a general rule, nonsensical to include corporations among the 
bearer of individual rights and freedoms.  To be sure, cases where corporations have 
challenged legislation under the Charter has undoubtedly conferred benefits to individual 
Canadians by giving the SCC a chance to articulate the scope and application of these 
rights and freedoms but it has come at a cost. 
Governmental decisions need oversight.  The Charter together with Canadian 
courts provides an effective oversight mechanism, which aim at reducing laws that are 
unconstitutional.  However, there are times when government passes a law that is 
crafted to address social policy issues associated with corporate activity.  These include 
the protection of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups of people, the protection of our 
environment, or laws that govern the exercise of managerial conduct in relation to the 
corporation.  It is precisely these laws that have, at times, been the focus of corporate 
discontent.  Accessing the Charter allows corporations to reduce valid legislative 
responses to pressing public issues. 
The general rule supported by this thesis is that corporations should not be 
allowed to protect their economic interests (and this is their only interest, insofar as a 
corporation can be said to have an interest) by reducing their legal liability through 
Charter challenges.  This general rule includes both counting corporations among 
“people” that enjoy Charter rights and freedoms and granting corporations standing to 
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argue that certain laws are invalid (to reiterate, corporations should be granted standing 
to make Charter arguments but should not be able to benefit from a successful 
argument).  However, there are times when this rule is too rigid and may prevent 
effective enforcement of laws that benefit all Canadians, including, in limited 
circumstances, corporations. 
To allow for such cases, the SCC could create a public interest doctrine that 
provides for certain criteria to be met before a corporation could bring a Charter 
challenge.  Such a public interest doctrine would represent a procedural hurdle for 
corporations that wish to make Charter arguments from which they could benefit.  Such 
a test would render the purposive analysis, corporate theory, and arguments that permit 
corporations to gain standing obsolete.  By rendering these approaches to corporate 
rights obsolete, the courts would also render the Wittgensteinian representationalist 
model of language in relation to understanding corporations obsolete.  A public interest 
doctrine, then, would recognize that corporations belong to a language game different 
than that of natural people.  Any exceptions to the rule that corporations should not be 
granted Charter rights and freedoms would be justified if and only if a corporation would 
be able to demonstrate that granting the corporation a right or freedom serves the 
interests of the public. 
To dispense with a related but separate issue, the courts should never resist a 
corporation that seeks standing to make a Charter claim.  This could be allowed on the 
condition that the corporation may not benefit from such an argument.  Corporations with 
a deep commitment to social issues that possess sufficient financial resources can 
employ a legal team to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional law.  Corporate 
management is free to conduct an internal cost/benefit analysis on this strategy; 
however, it would not be able to include in that analysis the economic benefit of a 
reduction in legal liability because if the corporate litigant were successful, the 
unconstitutional law would only be struck down in favour of natural people. 
Where a corporate litigant seeks to convince a court that standing isn’t enough 
and that corporations should be granted the particular right or freedom in question, a 
corporate litigant would be able to make a claim with a court of appropriate jurisdiction to 
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demonstrate why its case meets the threshold of a public interest test.  If the corporate 
litigant meets the test, it would then be able to argue the merits of its case.7 
To establish such a test, it must include sound policy reasons that extend beyond 
a corporation’s interest in maximizing profit.  Nearly all the cases discussed in chapter 3 
were brought about by corporations seeking to further their own economic interests.  
While some of these cases saw a benefit conferred to an historically disadvantaged 
group and the integrity of our legal system (the Little Sisters case on the application of 
freedom of expression to a minority group of people or the CIP case on being tried within 
a reasonable time), there are a number of other cases where corporations simply 
benefited without conferring a broader social benefit. 
So, to provide the humble beginnings to a test, it is useful to review some of the 
cases discussed in this thesis.  A new public interest doctrine might provide for a three-
step test that a corporation would have to satisfy before it could make before it would be 
able to argue whether a law violates the Charter.  In summary, the three-step test could 
incorporate the following: first, the corporate litigant would have to demonstrate that 
granting the corporation a right or freedom under the Charter is of “sufficient importance” 
to the public or a segment of the public.  Second, it would have to demonstrate that 
natural people would not suffer any deleterious effects should the corporation be granted 
the right or freedom.  And finally, the corporate litigant would have to show how granting 
a right or freedom to a corporation would confer benefits to natural persons.  To make 
this argument, I will survey some cases that can provide some guidance to establishing 
such a test. 
The Oakes case might provide some guidance for step one of the test regarding 
“sufficient importance”.  To recap, the Oakes case provided the framework to determine 
what constitutes a “reasonable limit” on a Charter protected right or freedom.  The first 
step, again, is to ensure that the legislation is of “sufficient importance to warrant 
overriding a constitutionally protect right or freedom” (Oakes 138).  This first step can be 
modified for a public interest doctrine. 
                                                
7 This is a very rough sketch of the procedural hurdle that a corporate litigant would have to face 
in order to be able attract a Charter right or freedom beyond mere standing.  A full account of this 
procedural step is outside the scope of this thesis; however, it would likely arise as voir dire within 
the trial.  If successful, the trial would continue so that the court could hear the merits of a Charter 
challenge under the now established assumption that the corporate litigant would be able to 
benefit from a successful Charter argument. 
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Where corporations seek protection under the Charter, they must establish that 
applying the right or freedom to a corporation is of “sufficient importance” to the public or 
a segment of the public.  This recognizes that corporations occupy a different language 
game than natural persons.  This factor also helps to dislodge the focus from the 
corporation’s interests and emphasizes the importance of natural persons and the effect 
that granting a right to a corporation would have. 
The “sufficient importance” step could have arisen in the CIP case (discussed 
above).  CIP Inc. argued that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been 
violated (of course, the SCC agreed that such right extends to corporations but not, as 
was the case in CIP, where the corporate entity was the very cause of the unreasonable 
length of the trial).  Arguments in cases like this that support the extension of this right to 
corporations would be about maintaining a legal system with efficiency and integrity 
where witnesses are available to testify with their memories intact.  As stated by the 
SCC, the “right to a fair trial is fundamental to our adversarial system” (CIP 856).  
Maintaining a legal system where trials and appeals with integrity and efficiency would 
qualify as sufficiently important to grant the right to be tried within a reasonable time. 
Freedom of expression may also be another strong justification to support the 
“sufficient importance” test.  Cases like Irwin Toy and RJR argued that their right to 
freely express themselves arose in the context in marketing, which might not bring about 
the relevant degree of “sufficient importance.”  However, the Thomson 1998 case 
involving the publishing of election results might.  Here, freedom of expression about 
election results is part of a transparent democracy and might quality as sufficiently 
important. 
The second step of the public policy doctrine can be analogized with the second 
step of the Oakes Test. This step of the Oakes test assesses the fairness in the balance 
of society’s interests with the rights of individuals (Oakes 139).  This step allows the 
courts to evaluate whether the legislation would have any deleterious effects on the 
rights of individuals or groups.  To do this, the court would weigh the negative effects 
that the legislation might have on their rights.  A modified version of this test for the 
public interest doctrine would permit the courts to investigate whether natural persons 
would suffer any deleterious effects should the court grant such rights to corporations. 
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For example, granting a corporation a right to free speech would render the 
challenged legislation invalid.  Where legislation is in place, for example, to prevent the 
advertising of harmful or potentially harmful goods (alcohol and/or tobacco, for instance), 
the court would have to examine the purpose of the law in question.  Understanding the 
purpose of the legislation would provide clarity about the benefits that it’s meant to 
confer upon natural persons.  With that in mind, the court would be able to determine 
whether rendering that law invalid would have a negative effect on natural persons.  It 
could consider issues such as the effects that manipulative marketing can have on 
people or whether the legislation in question aims to protect the health and safety of 
individuals.  Since corporations engage in multimillion dollar marketing campaigns that 
attempt to manipulate by appealing to a person’s desires, the court might conclude that 
a corporation should not be permitted such a right on the basis that it can have 
deleterious effects on certain groups of persons (such as children). 
Focussing on the effect that granting a Charter right would have on natural 
persons is something the SCC has, in part, considered when rendering judgement in 
Charter cases involving corporations.  This is evident in some of the freedom of 
expression cases.  The SCC has articulated the purpose behind freedom of expression 
as being fundamental in a “free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity of 
ideas and opinions for their inherent value both the community and the individual” (Irwin 
Toy 968).  Recognizing that corporations occupy a different language game than natural 
persons, it is inappropriate to suggest that freedom of expression is an “inherent value” 
enjoyed by corporations.  Commercial expression typically, but certainly not always, 
informs customers about the product and/or service it has to offer.  However, the SCC’s 
focus on “community” is helpful.  There may be occasions when a corporation 
challenges legislation under the Charter, the court would be compelled – as it did in the 
Devine case – to consider whether granting such a freedom to them would also benefit 
or negatively affect natural persons 
A third step of the public interest doctrine test could consider the benefit that a 
corporation has on Canadian society or some portion of it.  While corporations do pursue 
a profit, they provide important non-economic benefits to natural persons.  For example, 
media corporations, such as Hunter and Thomson, disseminate important news, political 
and otherwise.  Bookstores, like Little Sisters and Chapters, make available important 
works of literature.  Little Sisters serves the interests of a much smaller but 
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underrepresented segment of society.  Located in Vancouver’s West End, Little Sisters 
has “carried a specialized inventory catering to the gay and lesbian community which 
consisted largely of books that included…gay and lesbian literature…academic studies 
related to homosexuality, [and] AIDS/HIV safe sex advisory” (Little Sisters 1135).  While 
difficult to measure, Canadian courts could weave into the public interest doctrine 
considerations of this type. 
The SCC made this type of argument in the Lessard case where it pointed out 
that media plays an important role within a democratic society and therefore should be 
the focus of special consideration (Lessard 444).  Specifically, the SCC said that in 
addition to following the statutory requirements set out in the Criminal Code for a 
warrant, the justice of the peace ought to consider a number of factors.  One of those 
factors is the need to balance “between the competing interests of the state in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes and the right to privacy of the media in the 
course of their news gathering and news dissemination” (Lessard 445).  Additionally, the 
SCC stated that if the subject of the warrant is a media organization, that the 
“organization will not be unduly impeded in the publishing or dissemination of the news” 
as the court here recognizes the important role that media plays in society. 
That certain exceptions can be made for sound policy reasons lends credibility to 
the idea that there are just some corporations that serve a broader social function than 
just profit and that these corporations ought to be granted limited protections under the 
Charter.  Indeed, Justices LaForest and McLachlin recognized the important role that 
media plays in society.  Justice Laforest said that it is a “given that freedom of the press 
and other media is vital to a free and democratic society” and Justice McLachlin said that 
“the courts have recognized the special place of the press in a free and democratic 
society” (Lessard 429 and 450). 
The basis of this argument is that some corporations serve a broader social 
function beyond simply providing goods and services in a competitive market place.  
Only corporations that fulfill a broader social mandate would qualify under this step of 
the public policy doctrine.  All other corporations would not be entitled to such 
protections. 
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A three-part public interest doctrine would achieve two main goals: first, it would 
recognize that corporate personhood is a language game different than natural persons.  
Such a test would liberate judges from making arguments that must reach out to 
accurately represent a corporate “reality.”  And second, by recognizing that corporate 
personhood belongs to a different language game, Canadian courts would be in a better 
position to limit their arguments about the granting of Charter rights and freedoms to 
corporations to ones that serve the interests of Canadians and not the economic 
interests of corporations. 
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Chapter 7.  
 
Conclusion 
What we say matters.  How we say it matters at least as much.  By adopting a 
representationalist mode of language, what we say is informed by a certain set of 
assumptions.  This includes the idea that the world is comprised of facts and that 
language, when utilized with precision, can accurately represent the inner reality of a 
thing.  Representationalist language, or the “how we say it”, limits what we can say.  
Fidelity to the world of facts requires language-users to understand and properly 
articulate the states of affairs of a thing.  This “how we say” also limits what cannot be 
said: when language cannot represent something accurately, it must be passed over in 
silence. 
In the legal realm, the idea that there are facts that must be described accurately 
limits what, in particular, judges may say about the law.  In the case of corporations, the 
SCC has dedicated a lot of time to theorizing about what a corporation is and what 
interests it has.  This has led to a confined view about the application of Charter rights 
and freedoms to corporations, a view that concludes, on the whole, that corporations are 
entitled to such rights.  But focusing on the “states of affairs” of a corporation has 
prevented the courts from considering corporate rights in a broader social context. 
Using Wittgenstein’s conception of language as set out in the Philosophical 
Investigations is the type of heuristic device can get us to see how meaning in language 
arises based, in part, on the context in which a word is used.  This allows us to see that 
the “personhood” occupies different language games when used for natural persons and 
for corporations.  Placing these concepts in different language games, then, allows one 
to recognize similarities but, more importantly, see the vast differences.  Through these 
differences, it becomes clear the absurdity of granting Charter rights and freedoms to 
corporations. 
The history of case law surrounding the genesis and development of corporate 
personhood further illustrates this absurdity.  The courts have not only tolerated a 
piercing of the corporate veil when it serves society’s interests, it has also demonstrated 
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that there is no consistent conception of what exactly a corporate person is.  Despite this 
inconsistency, the SCC has been confident in being able to use corporate theory to 
describe what a corporation is and, through the purposive approach to the Charter, 
illuminate what interests rightfully belong to corporations. 
But the SCC’s discussion of what a corporation is and what interests it 
possesses has, for the most part, been divorced from what the legislated purpose of a 
corporation actually is.  It is, like Bakan said, akin to a psychopath due to the legal duty 
of officers and directors to act in the best interest of their corporation, an interest that 
translates into making that corporation a profit.  The pursuit of profit, above all else, is 
the goal of a corporation.  And while corporations can do good things, doing them is 
contingent upon the economic benefit that it provides them. 
Recognizing what corporations actually are and the self-interested things they 
can do (such as Canadian Tire and Nevsun) further reveals that corporations ought to be 
treated as having their own language game when it comes to rights and freedoms under 
the Charter.  However, a limited view of the corporation as inherently evil or 
fundamentally flawed may eliminate how corporations can be used as a tool to further 
protect and promote individual rights and freedoms in Canada. 
Adopting a public interest doctrine that, first, recognizes that corporate 
personhood for the purposes of Charter rights and freedoms eliminates the pursuit of 
corporations as facts with internal properties which courts must describe correctly.  
Secondly, such a doctrine would free judges to see corporations as entities that serve 
social interests.  These interests include the protection of freedom of expression or the 
right to be tried within a reasonable time and that corporations would only become a 
bearer of rights in the event that it serves this broader social interest. 
How judges craft legal arguments and how they employ language to support 
those arguments is important in understanding how the use of language might preclude 
certain possibilities.  Under a representationalist model of language, fidelity to the truth 
and avoiding nonsense is paramount.  Judges have spent a great deal of time dedicating 
their energy to this.  To borrow from Marcuse, there is something irrational about the 
otherwise rational character of these legal arguments. 
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Utilizing language as a series of games where meaning is derived through the 
context in which words are used gives life to innumerable possibilities.  It might also help 
judges escape the irrationality of the current approach to corporate rights and freedoms 
under the Charter.  Preserving rights and freedoms for natural people and not 
corporations would represent a commitment by judges to curtail the ability of already 
powerful corporations, some of which are multi-national, to effect the legal landscape by 
appealing to the Charter. 
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